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I. INTRODUCTION: SYMPTOMS OF THE MODERN MALADY 
  Chip was struck by the broad similarities between black-
market Lithuania and free-market America.  In both countries, 
wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few; any meaningful 
distinction between private and public sectors had disappeared; 
captains of commerce lived in a ceaseless anxiety that drove them 
to expand their empires ruthlessly; ordinary citizens lived in 
ceaseless fear of being fired and ceaseless confusion about which 
powerful private interest owned which formerly public institution 
on any given day; and the economy was fueled largely by the 
elite’s insatiable demand for luxury. 
 Jonathan Franzen, The Corrections1 
 
Jonathan Franzen’s description of modern life resonates pro-
foundly as a portrait of the muddled convergence of political, legal, 
and economic forces in free-market America.  The situation causes 
me pervasive unease, “ceaseless anxiety,” in Chip Lambert’s termi-
nology,2 regarding its effect on the ability of ordinary citizens to ac-
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 1 JONATHAN FRANZEN, THE CORRECTIONS 443-44 (2001). 
 2 Chip is not the only Lambert so affected.  Gary Lambert’s every thought and 
feeling, even about his wife and children, comes to him in market-metaphor terms.  
For example, one Sunday afternoon, as Gary Lambert enters his new darkroom to 
engage in his new hobby, “[h]e had a spring in his step, an agreeable awareness of 
his above-average height and his late-summer suntan.  His resentment of his wife, 
Caroline, was moderate and well contained.  Declines led advances in key indices of 
paranoia (e.g., his persistent suspicion that Caroline and his two older sons were 
mocking him), and his seasonally adjusted assessment of life’s futility and brevity was 
consistent with the overall robustness of his mental economy.”  Id. at 139-40.  The 
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cess their legal system and to control their political and economic 
destinies.3  What are the causes of our sense of alienation from the in-
stitutions that are supposed to exist to serve us?  My thought is this: 
the modern conservative4 agenda, which has steered national policy, 
academic discourse, and judicial decision-making in the areas of cor-
poration, contract, and consumer law for two decades, crushes the 
potential of individuals to assert their interests and to act collectively 
as a countervailing power5 to the self-serving, self-perpetuating corpo-
rate institutions that govern modern life. 
Consider the following case studies, the details of which will be 
discussed throughout this Article: 
THE CORPORATE SIDE: Examination of two cases on the corpo-
rate side reveals the sharp divergence between private and public in-
terest, starkly visible when the curtain of unbridled corporate pre-
rogative is lifted.  Both cases concern publicly-held firms that began 
as energy companies whose CEOs envisioned broad expansion and 
unlimited wealth creation.  The cases run parallel to this point, but 
diverge at the juncture at which, in one case, the transparency man-
dated by regulation opens a window on the decision-making of man-
agement and its effect on shareholder and consumer welfare, causing 
regulators to intervene. 
Unregulated business: The first case, which concerns unregulated 
business run amok, could be drawn from any of a dozen recent in-
stances of large, publicly-owned corporations whose CEOs and upper 
                                                                                                                                      
novel’s title is itself a bright, multifaceted metaphor that derives one of its meanings 
from what financial markets do when they fall out of balance. 
 3 But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contrac-
tarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 898 
(1995) (book review). 
As a societal decisionmaking norm, the economic freedom to pursue 
wealth does more than just expand the economic pie.  A legal system 
that pursues wealth maximization [through freedom of contract] nec-
essarily allows individuals to pursue the accumulation of wealth.      
Economic liberty, in turn, is a necessary concomitant of personal lib-
erty. . . . [T]he modern public corporation has become a powerful en-
gine for focusing the efforts of individuals to maintain the requisite 
sphere of economic liberty. 
Id. (paragraph structure omitted). 
 4 As George Nash noted, there is no “compact definition of conservatism” and 
yet there exist “alignments” which can be identified and described with accuracy.  
GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 
1945, at xiii (1976).  For a cogent discussion of the difficulties of defining conserva-
tism, see Jerry Z. Muller, Introduction to CONSERVATISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM DAVID HUME TO THE PRESENT (Jerry Z. Muller ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter CONSERVATISM]. 
 5 The term “countervailing power” was coined in JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, 
AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 111 (rev. ed. 1956). 
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management have engaged in self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and 
fraud, right under the noses of their internal governing boards, while 
an underfunded6 Securities and Exchange Commission stood idly by.  
But the best example to illustrate the themes of this Article is Enron, 
because as a powerful and successful lobbyist for deregulation of the 
energy market,7 the company virtually defined laissez-faire ideology in 
the 1980s and 1990s.8 
In its thirteen-year existence, Enron seemed uniquely capable of 
bedazzling politicians, policy-makers, banks, accountants, law firms, 
analysts, and investors with its blend of cutting-edge business strat-
egy,9 huge amounts of capital,10 and good old-fashioned influence-
peddling.  Because Enron’s demise caused devastating financial losses 
throughout the global economy,11 it stands as its own compelling ar-
                                                          
 6 Critics of both political parties say the SEC was underfunded for years.  Chuck 
Neubauer, Bush to Request SEC Budget Hike, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 18.  In No-
vember 2002, the House Republican leadership passed a continuing resolution pro-
viding roughly $300 million less in SEC funding than the $776 million authorized by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Frank Set to Provide Combative Voice at Financial Services, NAT’L 
JOURNAL’S CONG. DAILY, Nov. 14, 2002.  The 2002 fiscal year budget was $438 million.  
Neubauer, supra. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $750 million in 
fiscal 2003 for the SEC, but the House Appropriations Committee took no action in 
2002.  As of March 24, 2003, Congress still had not passed spending for most of the 
2003 budget, including the SEC’s funds; the administration has requested $568 mil-
lion.  Id.  The SEC proposed a budget of $841.5 million for fiscal 2004, but Congress 
cut it by $30 million because the agency had not hired new employees quickly 
enough.  Cut Proposed for SEC Budget; Hiring Delays Are Cited for the Reduction, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at C4.  The Bush Administration’s fiscal 2005 budget proposes 
$893 million for the SEC, double the 2002 budget.  Kathleen Day, Budget Plan In-
cludes More for SEC, Mortgage Overseer, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2004, at E1. 
 7 See Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A1 (“Beginning in the early 1990’s, Enron pursued its cam-
paign for energy deregulation by hiring dozens of Washington’s most influential 
lobbyists and showering Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill with large cam-
paign contributions.”). 
 8 See Robert Kuttner, Enron: A Powerful Blow to Market Fundamentalists, BUS. WK., 
Feb. 4, 2002, at 20 (“Enron epitomized an entire philosophy about the supposed self-
cleansing nature of markets.”). 
 9 The Enron business model rested on the belief that ideas that make millions in 
one commodity could be transferred to another, with the same lucrative result.  
Eichenwald, supra note 7.  Enron thus expanded its natural gas business to include 
electricity, steel, weather, wood pulp, advertising, insurance, and internet commodi-
ties, becoming one of the biggest e-commerce companies in the world.  Id. 
 10 By 1995, Enron controlled one-fifth of the North American natural gas market.  
Id.  In its “golden years,” its annual revenues reached $100 billion.  Id.  By the end of 
1999, Enron had become the seventh largest company on the Fortune 500 list.  Beth-
any McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58. 
 11 Enron’s collapse was felt far from Washington.  In Japan, for example, “the 
company’s woes triggered billions of dollars of withdrawals from money market 
funds that had invested heavily in Enron stock.  In India, a deal to sell a huge power 
plant that was built as part of the company’s expanding overseas empire has fallen 
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gument for ex ante regulation,12 both private and public,13 of publicly-
held companies.14 
Several aspects of the Enron case illustrate the themes of this Ar-
ticle.  First, the company’s relentless, manic drive for growth caused 
its decision-makers, from top management on down, to lose sight of 
the corporate mission, the interests of the shareholders, and, ulti-
mately, its reason for existing in the first place, its customers.15  Al-
though entirely predictable, given the unchecked self-interest behind 
Enron’s rapid expansion, its demise appeared, superficially, to take 
Washington politicians by surprise, prompting them to pass hastily 
                                                                                                                                      
apart.”  Eichenwald, supra note 7. 
 12 Ex ante regulation occurs prospectively, when government promulgates a 
regulatory scheme to promote economic, equitable, or social aims.  Joseph P. To-
main, Networkingindustries.Gov.Reg., 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 829, 831 (2000) [hereinafter 
Networking].  More broadly, “[e]x ante analysis is a form of prospective or policy ar-
gumentation.  The primary question posed is: What will the effects of a rule or deci-
sion be?  Ex ante analysis is contrasted with ex post analysis which attempts to resolve 
a past dispute between parties.”  Joseph P. Tomain, Contract Compensation in Nonmar-
ket Transactions, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 877 n.27 (1985). 
 13 Of the two forms of corporate governance regulation promulgated recently, 
the private form, including the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ standards, 
more directly and effectively addresses the root problem of corporate malfeasance by 
emphasizing self-control and self-governance rather than external governance.  See 
infra notes 230-49 and accompanying text. 
 14 For example, here is a breakdown of Enron-caused losses in a small sampling 
of pension funds: 
 
Entity Loss in millions 
Florida state board of administration $335 
University of California regents $144 
Georgia state pension fund $127 
Ohio state pension fund $114 
New York City pension fund $109 
Other institutions $447 
 
Leslie Wayne, Enron’s Many Strands: Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A32. 
 15 Greed, favoritism, cover-ups, and unethical practices created a culture of “any-
thing goes.” 
The multi-layered system of checks-and-balances . . . completely broke 
down.  Executives of public companies have legal and moral responsi-
bilities to produce honest books and records. . . .  Outside auditors are 
supposed to make sure that a company’s financial reports not only 
meet the letter of accounting rules but also give investors and lenders a 
fair and accurate picture of what’s going on. . . .  [L]enders are sup-
posed to make sure borrowers are creditworthy. . . .  Wall Street ana-
lysts are supposed to dig through company numbers to divine what’s 
really happening. . . .  Regulators didn’t regulate, Enron’s board of 
directors didn’t direct. 
Allan Sloan, Who Killed Enron?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002, at 18. 
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drafted legislation to address symptoms of a deeper, culturally-rooted 
disease.16  Arrogance and greed had handily overwhelmed what, ac-
cording to conservative theory, is supposed to be the prime motivator 
of corporate conduct—shareholder primacy.17 
Another aspect of the Enron debacle deserving attention is the 
message it communicates respecting the critical role of both private 
and public regulation in promoting and sustaining healthy econo-
mies.  On many levels, the Enron case served as a laboratory for 
American conservative economic and political theories, which had 
been developing since the 1960s.18  Enron bought deregulation, then 
exploited the weaknesses the absence of those rules created.  Appeal-
ing to the “rational self-interest” of all with whom it dealt, manage-
ment created a rotating “garden” of fruitful conflicts of interest to be 
harvested when ripe.  Enron and similar recent corporate “melt-
downs” suggest several observations: 
• modern conservatives’ claims that deregulation and pro-
merger Efficiency Doctrine is good for the economy 
generally and consumers in particular are contradicted 
by both the lessons of history and an abundance of fresh 
evidence, and work to undermine the core values conser-
vatives profess to hold dear; 
• when corporations focus on their continued existence, 
rather than on the reason for their existence, excessive 
profit motive comes to dominate the corporate mission, 
and fair treatment of shareholders, employees, and con-
sumers becomes, at most, a peripheral afterthought. 
Regulated business: The second illustrative case on the corporate 
side provides a revealing glimpse behind the scenes of a publicly-held 
company whose management attempted, in the lexicon of Chip 
Lambert, ruthlessly to build an empire.  In this case, however, the 
company’s ambitious CEO faced unexpected hurdles in the form of a 
statutorily-created consumer organization [CURB]19 and a state cor-
poration commission that took its job seriously. 
                                                          
 16 Although greed and corruption “have always lingered at the edges of Corpo-
rate America . . . [the] ‘extreme greed at the top is new,’” according to management 
expert Peter Drucker.  Gary Strauss, How Did Business Get So Darn Dirty?, USA TODAY, 
June 12, 2002, at 1B. 
 17 See infra notes 250-97 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 88-133 and accompanying text. 
 19 The Kansas Citizens Utility Ratepayer Board (“CURB”) consists of five mem-
bers appointed by the governor and employs a consumer counsel.  KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 66-1222(a) (2002).  CURB’s counsel is empowered to represent residential and 
small commercial ratepayers before the commission, initiate actions before the 
commission, and intervene in formal complaints affecting ratepayers.  Id. § 66-1223. 
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 In 1995, a midwestern company hired an ambitious “new 
economy” takeover expert, a Wall Street Golden Boy,20 to transform it 
from a financially stable utility concern, Western Resources, Inc., into 
an aggressive engine of acquisition in order to position it for an in-
creasingly competitive deregulated energy market.  The CEO’s En-
ron-esque vision included simultaneous aggression on dual fronts: 
expand the energy holdings and diversify into unregulated indus-
tries21 in an effort to position the company for the transition into a 
deregulated future. 
Despite the efforts of the hard-driving new CEO, the company’s 
efforts to diversify hit a series of snags, as the state corporation com-
mission held hearings on a proposed merger with a neighboring util-
ity company, acquisitions of various unregulated concerns, and a 
complicated restructuring proposal.22  The state corporation commis-
sion focused on a single statutorily-defined issue:23 whether the 
planned merger would be in the public interest.  Annoyed by the de-
tailed public investigations, a company official announced that the 
company would “not tolerate additional financial restrictions placed 
on our company . . . .”24  By law, however, the company had no 
                                                          
 20 David C. Wittig came to Western Resources as a vice president in 1995 from 
Salomon Brothers in New York, where he had been co-head of mergers and acquisi-
tions.  Western Resources’ Wittig Finds Kansas Like Wall Street, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 10, 
1996 [hereinafter Wall St.].  Wittig, a Kansas native and graduate of the University of 
Kansas, had served as a poster boy for the takeover mania of the 1980s, having been 
featured on the cover of Fortune magazine in 1986.  Id.  Despite his Kansas roots, Wit-
tig was regarded, suspiciously, as a New York export by Kansans, one of whom re-
ferred to him bitterly as “the wheeler-dealer whiz kid from back East.”  Virgil J. Hal-
lauer, Letter to the Editor, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Feb. 5, 2002. 
 21 The strategy was to acquire deregulated home services businesses, which have a 
natural link to the provision of utilities, such as electricity, so that both could be dis-
tributed through the same system.  Charles V. Bagli, ADT vs. Chase: Testing Limits of 
Bank’s Role in Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1997, at A35. 
 22 See Jim McLean, KCC Bars Western Restructuring, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Oct. 4, 2001, at 
A7; Jim McLean, Groups Spar Over Western Restructuring, TOPEKA CAP.-J., June 27, 2001, 
at A1; Jim McLean, Hearing Tests Western, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 29, 2001, at A1; Jim 
McLean, Western Merger Collapses; KCPL Cites Stock Price, Ends Deal, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Jan. 
4, 2000, at A1; Jim McLean, Graves’ Touch Felt in Western Negotiations, TOPEKA CAP.-J., 
May 24, 1999; Associated Press, Second Consultant: Utility Merger Would Be Bad for Cus-
tomers, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 14, 1999.  See generally Docket 01-WSRE-949-GIE, Western 
Resources, Inc. d/b/a Westar Energy [hereinafter 2001 Docket], available at 
http://kcc.state.ks.us/docket/cal.html?history=closed&fiscal=2000 (last visited Mar. 
31, 2004). 
 23 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-101 to -1,238 (2002).  The statutory scheme grants 
broad authority to the Kansas Corporation Commission to “supervise and control the 
electric utility companies” of the state.  Id. § 66-101; see Restructuring Watch: Kansas 
Commission Probes Merger’s Retail Market Power, ELEC. J., Dec. 1997. 
 24 Kansas Regulators Examine Merger Deal, THE ENERGY REP., Aug. 9, 1999. 
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choice. 
In the end, the corporation commission denied the company au-
thority to restructure.25  The commission characterized the proposal 
as an attempt to shift equity from the solvent utilities businesses to 
the insolvent deregulated businesses, which would, in effect, impose 
the debt burden on energy buyers.26  The commission’s exhaustive 
analysis of the company’s proposed transactions from the perspective 
of the ultimate consumers of its services, individual and industrial 
purchasers,27 starkly illuminated the divergence of the interests at 
stake.  Western asserted that it had to expand rapidly to remain com-
petitive in the new market;28 the Commission disagreed, finding that 
the company was already over-earning, making ill-advised business 
decisions, and measurably harming consumer interests.29  The com-
                                                          
 25 On May 22, 2001, the Kansas Corporation Commission issued an order stating 
that an allocation agreement between Western and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Westar Industries, Inc., was contrary to the public interest and enjoined Western 
from taking any action that would increase the company’s debt.  See Supplemental 
Order, May 22, 2001, 2001 Docket, supra note 22, at 7-8, available at 
http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/scan/ 200105/20010522140205.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2004). 
 26 See Order for Western Resources to Permanently Halt Restructuring and 
Affirming the May 22, 2001 Order, July 20, 2001, 2001 Docket, supra note 22, at 10-13 
[hereinafter July 20, 2001 Order] (finding the proposed split-off of the regulated 
from unregulated businesses would have direct effect of placing Westar debt on the 
electric businesses and diminish the value of Western Resources, thus affecting rate-
payers adversely), available at http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/scan/200107/2001072 
0164834.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 27 Interveners in the case included the City of Wichita, a school district, Goodyear 
Tire Co., and Kansas Industrial Consumers.  See, e.g., Petition for Intervention by the 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 2001 Docket, supra note 22 (filed June 4, 2001), 
available at http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/scan/200106/20010604154321.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2004); Petition for Intervention by Kansas Industrial Consumers, 2001 
Docket, supra note 22 (filed May 29, 2001), available at http://www.kcc. 
state.ks.us/scan/200105/20010530101119.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); Petition to 
Intervene by Unified School District No. 259, 2001 Docket, supra note 22 (filed May 
25, 2001), available at http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/scan/200105/ 20010529104346.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004); Petition for Leave to Intervene by the City of Wichita, 
2001 Docket, supra note 22 (filed May 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/scan/ 200105/20010522101753.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2004). 
 28 See Jim McLean, Western’s Boss Warns of Crisis, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 17, 2001, at 
A1. 
 29 See July 20, 2001 Order, supra note 26. 
 30 See Robert Frank & Rebecca Smith, Power Outage: Highflying CEO Brings Scandal 
to Topeka’s Westar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2003, at A1.  CURB forced Western Resources 
to produce its logs for the company’s fleet of planes.  Though the logs were not 
made public, the popular perception was that Western’s executives were “jetting 
around at ratepayers’ expense.”  Bernard Condon, Image Problem: Dealmaker David 
Wittig Returned to Kansas as a Hero.  No More., FORBES, July 9, 2001, at 66.  “Are cus-
tomers paying for multi-million dollar salaries, mansions, and corporate jets?” asked 
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pany did not bolster its case when in the midst of plummeting stock 
prices its executives were drawing multi-million dollar salaries, jetting 
across the country in newly-purchased aircraft, and generally appear-
ing to live the high life on the backs of the energy-using public.30 
When considered alongside the Enron case, this case suggests 
the following themes: 
• although the “public interest”31 is currently not a popular 
                                                                                                                                      
Wichita’s mayor Bob Knight.  Id.  Western’s CEO received total compensation in 
1999 of $8.1 million, and in 2000, $3.8 million, plus a generous golden parachute.  Is 
Western Resources Another Enron?, THE ELEC. DAILY, Feb. 19, 2002. 
 31 I am defining public interest as an interest held commonly by a substantial per-
centage of citizens.  It does not make much difference whether such a commonly-
held interest is viewed as an aggregation of individual interests or as a concept of 
“general welfare,” distinct from aggregated individual interests.  See Cheryl D. Block, 
Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 993-99 
(1992).  Provision of necessities such as electricity at affordable prices is a “public in-
terest” under either definition.  The point is that individual interests must be com-
piled, analyzed, and represented in some manner, as against aggregated private in-
terests in corporate form.  See generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A 
CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT (1960); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
 The United States Supreme Court has recognized as being “affected with a 
public interest” diverse businesses such as restaurants, urban housing, inns, carriers, 
telephone companies, drug stores, hospitals, gas and electricity providers, and busi-
nesses involving patented processes.  See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 253-55 
(1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275-78 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). 
 32 As Robert Kuttner observes: 
for three decades now, the dominant strain of economics from the 
University of Chicago has been teaching gullible undergraduates and 
journalists that there is no such thing as the public interest.  Efficient 
outcomes are just the aggregation of selfish private interests, and gov-
ernment’s main job is to get out of the way. 
Kuttner, supra note 8.  To some extent, of course, law is like fashion, subject to popu-
lar currents.  See Robert A. Hillman, “The New Conservatism” in Contract Law and the 
Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 886-87 (1999) (arguing that capacity of 
common law to reflect changes in public opinion demonstrates a healthy legal sys-
tem). 
 33 Today’s legal scholars, particularly in the corporate law area, challenge the 
usefulness of the concept of “the public interest.”  As Helen A. Gartan noted in Regu-
latory Scholarship in the Law School, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 911 (1992), 
the standard scholarly critique of regulation [is that it is] either obso-
lescent or economically irrational. . . .  The standard critique posits that 
most regulation is not a public-regarding response to market failure 
but a deliberate interference with efficiently functioning markets.  Why 
then is regulation enacted?  Legislators may have mistakenly believed 
that they were serving the public interest, but most legal scholars view 
regulation more darkly, treating it as the product of successful rent-
seeking by special interest groups who use the political process to profit 
from regulatory-induced market failure. 
Id. at 913. 
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concept,32 legally33 or culturally, it exists without regard to 
popularity or recognition and, despite conservatives’ un-
proven yet fervently asserted claims to the contrary, it 
does not somehow take care of itself in a free, unregu-
lated marketplace; 
• internal corporate governance structures, most notably 
corporate boards, frequently fail to govern at all, leaving 
executives unaccountable, management decisions unre-
viewed,34 and corporate conduct out of control;35 and 
• when an external, objective body investigates facts sur-
rounding corporate behavior, the truth emerges—
corporate maneuvers often are not about “better busi-
ness” or fostering healthy competition; they are not even 
about shareholder benefit; rather, they are about amass-
ing wealth and power for corporate management, only 
secondarily about shareholder concerns, and infre-
quently, if at all, concerned with consumers, the con-
stituency that ultimately supports corporations’ exis-
tence. 
THE CONSUMER SIDE: This third case is fungible to the extent it 
mirrors a myriad of others36 in which a small, non-consumer plaintiff 
                                                          
 34 For a discussion of recent reforms in this area, see infra notes 230-32 and ac-
companying text. 
 35 Frank Meyer’s phrase for the phenomenon was “laissez-faire anarchy.”  FRANK 
S. MEYER, IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM AND RELATED ESSAYS 6 (1996).  Meyer did not en-
dorse the concept that unfettered capitalism would lead to that result.  He used the 
term in an essay titled Collectivism Rebaptized in which he accused the New Conserva-
tives of the 1950s of joining collectivists and statists in promoting the “welfare soci-
ety.”  Id. at 3-13.  Meyer considered an unregulated economic system—as opposed to 
the Keynesian model of a state-controlled system—a necessary element for preserva-
tion of freedom.  Id. at 137. 
 36 As Professor Steward Macaulay succinctly sums up the position of the smaller 
plaintiff in recent years, whereas once law students “believed that a lawyer, armed 
only with reason, can champion the weak and overcome the powerful,” now “the hill 
is steeper and harder to climb.”  Stewart Macaulay, Almost Everything I Did Want to 
Know About Contract Litigation: A Comment on Galanter, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 629, 635-36. 
 37 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-98 (1974) [hereinafter Galanter, The Haves] 
(stating that repeat players are actors “who are engaged in many similar litigations 
over time,” such as insurance companies and prosecutors, who have low stakes in any 
one case and the resources to pursue their long run interests).  Professor Galanter 
now divides the players into the “uphill cluster,” defined as cases brought by indi-
viduals against organizations, and the “downhill cluster,” defined as cases typically 
brought by plaintiff organizations against organizational or individual defendants.  
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know 
About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 592-93. 
 
  
930 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:921 
attempts to press a claim for economic damages against a large, re-
peat-player corporation37 that has unilaterally injected a boilerplate 
form “contract” into the transaction.  Notably, the case involves an 
independent, small businessman, a nostalgic symbol to traditional po-
litical conservatives38—a farmer—who goes head-to-multi-head with 
an international corporation in a battle over a defective farm imple-
ment.39 
In Limestone Farms, a farmer acquired a new John Deere planter 
for his farm.  The dealership represented the planter as new and suit-
able for the farmer’s particular needs, and told the farmer that the 
planter carried a good manufacturer’s warranty from Deere & Com-
                                                          
 38 The following exchange at a 1999 GOP debate in Iowa epitomizes conservative 
nostalgia regarding the family farm: 
BROKAW: [A]s so much of the American economy is moving to the 
economy of scale these days—we used to [have] mom-and-pop shoe 
stores and men’s clothing stores on main streets and little drug stores, 
now we’ve got Costco and Wal-Mart and all the other big stores—why 
should the family farm . . . be any more protected than the corner drug 
store or the mom-and-pop store, or the little grocery store that we used 
to find on Main Street? 
 
ALAN KEYES: It has actually been the case since the republic was 
founded, that the family farm, from Jefferson all the way forward, has 
been understood as one of the bedrock sources of the moral character 
of this nation, of the sense of the combination of individuality and 
commitment to community; the ability to shoulder hard work, at the 
same time that you value the achievements of individuals in the context 
of their contribution to family and community. . . .  That sense of indi-
vidualism that also knows how to dedicate itself to the good of others, 
has been born and has been nurtured and has been sustained in Amer-
ica’s family farming sector.  We lose the family farm, and we lose the 
nursery of America’s moral character.  We can’t afford that.  And I 
think we therefore have a stake that goes beyond money.  It goes be-
yond food. . . .  It’s a question of America’s moral decency. 
The Iowa Debate (Dec. 13, 1999), at http://www.gwu.edu/~action/primdeb/prim-
deb1213t.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).  But see Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 809 (1995) (stating that modern farmers deserve to experience the 
lessons of the free marketplace after having been supported by government subsidies 
for decades). 
 39 See Limestone Farms, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 29 P.3d 457 (Kan. 2001).  In the in-
terests of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author was plaintiffs’ counsel in 
the case. 
 40 Brief for Appellant at 5-6, 8, Limestone Farms, 29 P.3d 457 (No. 00-85278A) 
[hereinafter Brief].  Thus the seller expressly warranted the planter.  An express war-
ranty is created by “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.”  KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 84-2-313(a) (1996) (codifying U.C.C. § 2-313(a)).  Additionally, “[a]ny 
description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an ex-
press warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.”  U.C.C. § 2-313(b) 
(2002). 
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pany.40  When the farmer took the planter to the field, it proved im-
mediately and disastrously defective.41  As a result of two hydraulic de-
ficiencies, it failed to inject seed beneath the soil, instead dropping it 
on the surface of the ground.42  Over the next two months, covering 
as best he could, the farmer repeatedly attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
get assistance from the dealership and the manufacturer.  When the 
manufacturer’s corporate representatives eventually showed up at the 
farm, they were overheard laughingly referring to farmers as “stu-
pid.”43  As a result of the planter’s serious defects, the farmer suffered 
incidental44 and consequential damages45 of half a million dollars.46 
Relying on pertinent UCC provisions, the farmer and his farm 
company brought suit against the dealer and manufacturer, alleging 
breach of express warranties47 and failure of the essential purpose of 
the warranty.48  Based on the terms of a boilerplate purchase order, 
which the manufacturer required the dealership to use, but which 
the farmer never saw, the state trial court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants.49  Calling upon formalist privity requirements and 
                                                          
 41 Brief, supra note 40, at at 12. 
 42 Id. at 11-12. 
 43 Id. at 23. 
 44 The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) defines incidental damages as “ex-
penses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and cus-
tody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense 
incident to the delay or other breach.”  U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2002). 
 45 Consequential damages include “any loss resulting from general or particular 
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to 
know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”  Id. § 2-
715(2)(a). 
 46 Brief, supra note 40, at 24. 
 47 See id. at 1. 
 48 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-719(b)(2) (1996). 
 49 The farmer and his land lessor had agreed the latter would pay for the planter 
initially, and the farmer would repay the lessor the full purchase price within a 
month or two, as soon as his LLC was formed and could do business, which the 
farmer did two months later.  Brief, supra note 40, at 3, 9-10.  The dealership’s owner, 
who fully understood the purchase arrangement, visited the lessor’s representative to 
pick up the check for the planter, and had the representative sign the purchase or-
der, the boilerplate terms of which directly contradicted representations made to the 
farmer.  Id. at 5-6, 8. 
 50 The court’s approach contravenes the policy behind the UCC, which encour-
ages courts to look beyond the four corners of sales documents to understand the 
true intent of the parties involved in a transaction.  See U.C.C. § 2-202 (codified at 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-202 (1996)) (stipulating that written agreements may be ex-
plained or supplemented by oral evidence regarding course of dealing or course of 
performance).  Reversing the common law, the UCC establishes a presumption that 
a writing is not integrated.  Id. cmt. 2.  The course of actual performance of an 
agreement is deemed the best indication of what the parties intended the writing to 
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four-corners contract principles, the court refused to consider the ac-
tual terms of the negotiation,50 leaving the farmer to absorb the eco-
nomic losses.  The court of appeals affirmed.51  The farmer’s case il-
lustrates the following: 
• despite conservatives’ claims to the contrary, when eco-
nomic power is concentrated in large corporations, the 
free marketplace, driven by Efficiency Doctrine, does not 
protect consumer rights; 
• individuals and groups could serve as effective counter-
vailing forces against corporate overreaching, but cannot 
presently do so because the law, influenced by conserva-
tive theory, disfavors them. 
Examining these cases and their themes along the way, this Arti-
cle seeks to explore the negative impact of modern American conser-
vatism on corporation, contract, and consumer law over the last two 
decades.  It differs from other recent scholarship in that it does not 
start from the premise that the root of the recent corporate crises is 
the inadequacy of the securities laws, although those inadequacies 
certainly have been demonstrated.  Rather, it posits that conserva-
tives’ enthrallment with laissez-faire ideology has steered the devel-
opment and application of doctrine in these three substantive areas, 
which profoundly affects the legal relationships among actors from 
the retail counter to the corporate boardroom.  This dynamic results, 
paradoxically, in a diminution of individual economic freedom, the 
power of self-determination, and institutional accountability, values 
conservatives claim they want to promote. 
First, the Article summarizes the history of American conserva-
tism, emphasizing how political expedience and the allure of per-
sonal profit has turned a traditional philosophy on its head in this 
arena.  This section concludes that many modern conservatives ap-
pear to have abandoned bedrock conservative principles in service of 
an economic model that subverts their professed values, including 
virtue, the fair treatment of individuals according to merit, and the 
primacy of individuals over institutions.  Their principal explanation 
for this apparent contradiction between belief and conduct—that 
such values are appropriately and sufficiently nurtured in intermedi-
ate institutions, such as community, schools, churches, and “even . . . 
the internet”52—is not only unconvincing, but also at the very root of 
                                                                                                                                      
mean.  Id. 
 51 Limestone Farms, 29 P.3d at 462. 
 52 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 877. 
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current corporate and economic crises.  To borrow an attitude from 
former President Ronald Reagan, it is necessary to examine and verify 
such claims.53 
Next, the Article examines the contradiction between the mod-
ern conservative ideal of “unrestrained capitalism” and the actual 
consequences of this relentless push by conservatives towards a 
mythical state of deregulation, which seems to have thrust its prime 
movers into a fiscal and moral backwater—a place where conserva-
tives insist they do not want to be.  This section concludes that the 
laissez-faire ideal is grounded in an attractive, but pernicious fantasy.  
Pure laissez-faire has never actually existed and consequently must be 
recognized as a nostalgic and retrogressive myth.  This romanticized 
conservative model threatens to weaken further our economy and, 
threaded as it is through both broad policy and specific legal devel-
opments, tends to promote an elitist society in direct contradiction to 
core principles of democracy. 
The remainder of the Article analyzes the effect of the last two 
decades of conservative influence on the three areas of the law men-
tioned above, focusing on how conservative dominance in each area 
has worked to strip power from individuals and repose it in unac-
countable institutions.  Recent corporate scandals have concentrated 
attention on certain aspects of corporate governance, resulting in 
salutary reform efforts that are superficial, in part because of this 
deeper problem I perceive—the contradictions of modern conserva-
tism, which have permeated the law and culture beyond the politi-
cally prominent problem of corporate governance.  I conclude that 
these misguiding contradictions in modern conservatism must be 
recognized and resolved in order to restore health to the legal system 
and the economy. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 
Conservatism is not monolithic, of course, but it is divisible into 
distinct movements and schools of thought.  While political conserva-
tism has roots reaching back to ancient philosophers such as Plato 
                                                          
 53 President Reagan used the phrase “doveryai no proveryai” (“trust but verify”) 
in the context of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.  The Summit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 1987, at A21 (transcribing remarks of President Reagan and General Secre-
tary Mikhail Gorbachev during signing of treaty pledging the removal of Soviet and 
American medium- and short-range nuclear missiles from Europe), cited in Philip R. 
Principe, Secret Codes, Military Hospitals, and the Law of Armed Conflict: Could Military 
Medical Facilities’ Use of Encrypted Communications Subject Them to Attack Under Interna-
tional Law?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 727, 750 (2002). 
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and Cicero,54 and links along the way to Hobbes,55 Hume,56 Burke,57 
and Tocqueville,58 the focus here is on American conservatism. 
                                                          
 54 Traditional conservatives of the twentieth century adopted beliefs of Plato, Ar-
istotle, and Cicero, grounded in “rational natural law and emphasiz[ing] the duties 
of man.”  NASH, supra note 4, at 62.  Through rigorous textualism, Leo Strauss rein-
vigorated the study of natural law and the duties of man, directly challenging Tho-
mas Hobbes’ and the “moderns’” emphasis on natural rights.  Id. at 63. 
 55 One of the major contributions made to modern conservatism by Thomas 
Hobbes, seventeenth century English author of Leviathan, is his central assertion that 
human beings are by nature self-serving creatures who are motivated to surrender 
their liberty to the authority of the state out of fear of being dominated by those 
same impulses in others.  In Leviathan, Hobbes posited that war resulted from com-
petition for wealth; the need for physical safety; and the desire for personal glory.  
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1651).  Hobbes contended 
that without a common power to control these impulses man would be in a constant 
state of battle: 
 Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where 
every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, 
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, 
and their own invention shall furnish them withall.  In such condition, 
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: 
and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Build-
ing; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require 
much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of 
Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, contin-
uall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 
Id. at 64-65. 
 56 David Hume, a champion of commerce, believed that it was futile to attempt to 
ground justice on the “laws of nature,” independent of a source other than their 
proven utility.  See CONSERVATISM, supra note 4, at 41 n.4 (providing editorial com-
mentary on DAVID HUME, Of Justice, in AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS (1751)).  Like Burke, Hume believed in the necessity of political elites: 
The persons, who first attain this distinction by the consent, tacit or 
express, of the people, must be endowed with superior personal quali-
ties of valour, force, integrity, or prudence, which command respect 
and confidence: and after government is established, a regard to birth, 
rank, and station has a mighty influence over men, and enforces the 
decrees of the magistrate.  The prince or leader exclaims against every 
disorder, which disturbs his society. . . .  Habit soon consolidates what 
other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded; and men, 
once accustomed to obedience, never think of departing from that 
path, in which they and their ancestors have constantly trod, and to 
which they are confined by so many urgent and visible motives. 
DAVID HUME, Of the Origin of Government, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 
(1777), reprinted in CONSERVATISM, supra, at 49. 
 57 Englishman Edmund Burke believed in deriving guidance and inspiration not 
from reason, but “from the tested traditions of nature and Holy Scripture.”  CHARLES 
W. DUNN & J. DAVID WOODARD, THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN AMERICA 27 (1996).  
To Burke, “ideas of religion and government are closely connected.”  Id. at 28. 
 58 Alexis de Toqueville, an aristocratic Frenchman who came to the United States 
in 1831, influenced American postwar conservatives when his 1835 work Democracy in 
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During much of the nineteenth century, classical liberalism, 
then merely called liberalism, dominated American politics.  Al-
though initially imported from Europe,59 American nineteenth cen-
tury classical liberalism was founded upon a belief in independence 
and self-determination, and an aversion to centralized power.60  The 
Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights all rest 
on these principles, creating a system of government characterized by 
divided power and multiple checks and constraints.  Classical liberals 
resolutely defended religious freedom, individual liberties, and 
unlimited opportunity for economic expansion.61  They respected the 
prerogatives attending the ownership of private property and per-
ceived history in terms of material progress.62  Their ideal presup-
posed the value of fulfillment through work, family, friends, and a 
“dense network of voluntary associations”63 in the private sphere. 
Nineteenth century liberals would become twentieth century 
conservatives.  But at the beginning of the twentieth century, the two 
political forces, classical liberalism and conservatism, were separate.  
On the one hand, belief in Jeffersonian individualism reached its na-
dir.64  At the same time, American industry and finance were boom-
ing; states were revising their incorporation laws to expand corporate 
autonomy; and “corporate capitalism” was born.65  By the 1920s, eco-
nomic conservatives, representing the business class, dominated 
American political thought.66  With the onset of the Great Depression, 
as economic conditions called for government intervention, the nar-
                                                                                                                                      
America was reissued in 1945.  Like Burke, Toqueville believed in the religious foun-
dation of strong government, including American democracy—that by regulating the 
customs of communities and domestic life, religion (in Toqueville’s case, specifically 
Christianity) effectively regulated the state.  See id. at 132.  He wrote, famously, “Do 
what you may, there is no true power among men except in the free union of their 
will; and patriotism and religion are the only two motives in the world that can long 
urge all the people toward the same end.”  Id. at 45. 
 59 Among the first groups that can be identified as liberal were the Dutch, who 
after decades of struggle won their independence from Spain and set up the United 
Provinces, a decentralized state with no king and little federal power.  Ralph Raico, 
The Rise, Fall, and Renaissance of Classical Liberalism, Part I, FREEDOM DAILY (1992), 
available at http://www.fff.org/freedom/0892c.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).  Work-
ing an “economic miracle,” the United Provinces “established a legal system based 
solidly on the rule of law and the sanctity of property and contract.”  Id. 
 60 SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 6 (1996). 
 61 Id. at 6-7. 
 62 Id. at 7. 
 63 Raico, supra note 59. 
 64 NASH, supra note 4, at 14 (quoting ROBERT CRUNDON, THE MIND AND ART OF 
ALBERT J. NOCK 179 (1964)). 
 65 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 37. 
 66 DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 57, at 102. 
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row, exclusionary conservatism dominated by business interests fell 
out of favor.67  Following his election as president in 1933, Franklin 
Roosevelt ushered in a variety of welfare programs.68  As World War II 
came to an end, conservatism again gained force, now dressed in new 
clothing.  The post-War conservative movement was organized in re-
action to what its members perceived as the alarmingly statist trend 
manifested in widespread support for the New Deal, the Fair Deal, 
and other post-war economic “planning” programs.69 
The first identifiable group of conservatives to emerge post-war 
consisted of a new breed of classical liberals who endeavored to steer 
America’s political development away from government intervention 
and back toward the “abandoned road” of individualism.70  They 
counted among their ranks Austrian economists71 Friedrich Hayek72 
                                                          
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 NASH, supra note 4, at xiii, 5-6, 22-23.  Among the most vehement anti-statists of 
the postwar era were Frank Chodorov and Ludwig von Mises.  Chodorov, who revived 
The Freeman (founded originally by Albert Jay Nock), was a “militant individualist,” 
who agreed with Nock’s proposition that “the State is our enemy,” its administrators 
and beneficiaries a “professional criminal class.”  Id. at 16-17.  Austrian born Mises, a 
libertarian, believed that lasting peace could occur only “under perfect capitalism.”  
Id. at 11.  For Mises, the main issue in postwar America was “whether or not man 
should give away freedom, private initiative, and individual responsibility and sur-
render to the guardianship of a gigantic apparatus of compulsion and coercion, the 
socialist state.”  Id. at 12.  He warned against every citizen becoming “a subordinate 
clerk in a bureau.”  Id. 
 70 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 17 (2d ed. 1956). 
 71 The “Austrian School” of economics, while associated in modern times with 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, actually began in the fifteenth century, when 
the Late Scholastics, followers of St. Thomas Aquinas, postulated the existence of 
“economic law,” consisting of “forces of cause and effect that operate similarly” to 
other natural laws.  Ludwig von Mises Institute, What Is “Austrian Economics?”, at 
http://www.mises.org/austrian.asp# (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).  “Over the course of 
several generations, they discovered and explained the laws of supply and demand, 
the cause of inflation, the operation of foreign exchange rates, and the subjective 
nature of economic value.”  Id.  Like their American émigré descendants, they advo-
cated property rights, and freedom to contract and trade, while opposing taxes, price 
controls, and regulations that inhibited enterprise.  Id. 
 72 The influence of Austrian-born Friedrich Hayek deserves special attention, for 
he brought to the development of twentieth century American conservatism a com-
bination of a libertarian viewpoint and an interest in economic theory that set the 
stage for the ascendency, three decades later, of a pro-corporate political agenda.  
Hayek and the Austrian School of economics favored free markets over centrally-
planned economies, which they termed “collectivist systems,” primarily because, 
practically speaking, effective planning of large economies was beyond the ability of 
central planners.  Carl T. Bogus, Symposium: Rational Actors or Rational Fools?  The Im-
plications of Psychology for Products Liability, Introduction, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2000).  Hayek argued that a “market” is best understood as a combination of indi-
viduals whose wants and needs are of infinite variety; no one planning agency can 
possibly anticipate and plan to fulfill such disparate and varying demand.  Id. at 1. 
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and Ludwig von Mises;73 professors of the nascent Chicago School of 
economics, including Frank Knight and Henry C. Simmons, who 
would become mentors to Milton Friedman;74 and the young William 
F. Buckley, Jr.75  They identified themselves variously as libertarians, 
classical liberals, or neo-liberals,76 but irrespective of nomenclature, 
they united in the fear that the predilection toward rationalistic 
“planning” of economic activity was a step down the road toward so-
cialism, even Naziism.77  Like nineteenth century classical liberals, 
they believed in economic freedom, minimal government, the impor-
tance of private property, rolling back the welfare state, and 
decentralization of political power.78 
Another strand of intellectuals, represented by European refu-
gees such as Leo Strauss, was also analyzing the changes brought 
about by the war and refining philosophical and political objections 
to the “hysterical optimism”79 driving the prevailing orthodoxy favor-
ing government intervention.80  In an attempt to distinguish them-
selves from the old-style, pro-business Republicanism of the 1920s, 
they called themselves “traditionalists” or “new conservatives.”81  
These individuals were more serious than the libertarian faction 
about reviving the European tradition of conservatism, based on 
Christian and classical natural law concepts.  They objected to the 
libertarian emphasis on modernity and individual Lockean “rights” at 
the expense of the notion of “the primacy of obligation,” which fixed 
man’s “moral duties in a civil society.”82  One of their most eloquent 
                                                                                                                                      
Hayek’s theories caught the attention of a professor at the University of Chicago, 
whose press published his The Road to Serfdom.  Id. at 2.  Later, Hayek helped secure 
substantial funding for a center at Chicago for the study of free markets, with the 
stipulation that it be tied to the law school, and the field of law and economics was 
born.  Id. 
 73 Despite their common opposition to left-wing socialist politics, Friedrich Hayek 
and Ludwig von Mises represented distinct wings of the classical liberal movement.  
The movement divided along the question of the desirable extent of government in-
volvement in the market system.  Mises believed passionately in freedom from gov-
ernment interference in markets, while Hayek rejected pure laissez-faire and favored 
government action to maintain the rule of law and “design” of the free market.  
NASH, supra note 4, at 32-33. 
 74 Id. at 284. 
 75 While initially aligned with the libertarian faction, Buckley had a “foot in both 
camps.”  Id. at 81. 
 76 Id. at xiii, 26, 36. 
 77 Id. at 5-6, 12, 20. 
 78 Id. at 171. 
 79 RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 129 (1948). 
 80 NASH, supra note 4, at 41 (quoting WEAVER, supra note 79, at 129). 
 81 Id. at 76-77. 
 82 Id. at 165. 
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representatives, Russell Kirk, set forth six philosophical canons, in-
cluding a belief in divinity and a corresponding conviction that po-
litical problems are religious and moral problems; an appreciation 
for the variety and mystery of traditional life; and the certitude that 
freedom and ownership of property were inseparably intertwined.83 
For a time, it seemed as if these two quite different interpreta-
tions of conservatism might cause a permanent rift in the young 
movement.  But the two groups shared a sense of isolation from 
mainstream political thought, as well as an almost desperate determi-
nation to achieve philosophical cohesion.  A number of factors 
helped mid-century conservative thought to coalesce.  One was Wil-
liam F. Buckley, Jr.’s founding of the magazine National Review, whose 
objective, Buckley claimed, would be “to revitalize the conservative 
position” and to “influence the opinion makers” of the nation.84  An-
other galvanizing force was communism, which triggered in the post-
war right a pervasive apprehension that the West was engaged in a 
monumental struggle with an aggressive and unyielding enemy.85 Yet 
another influence toward unification came in the writings of Frank 
Meyer, who believed that beneath the “cacophony”86 characterizing 
the conservative movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, there 
lay a foundation of shared principle.87 
In the 1960s and 1970s, still another group of intellectuals 
joined the conservative movement.  Calling themselves neo-
conservatives,88 they separated from the Democratic Party in disgust 
over what they perceived as the unpatriotic sentiments and exces-
sively permissive conduct of progressive and radical political activists 
of the era.89  Led by Irving Kristol,90 Nathan Glazer,91 and Norman 
                                                          
 83 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO SANTAYANA 7-8 (1956). 
 84 NASH, supra note 4, at 148. 
 85 Id. at xiii. 
 86 ALLEN GUTTMANN, THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN AMERICA 163 (1967). 
 87 NASH, supra note 4, at 174. 
 88 As described by Irving Kristol, one of the movement’s founders, neoconserva-
tives were “liberals who were mugged by reality.”  Irving Kristol, Neoconservative Guru 
to America’s New Order, MACLEAN’S, Jan. 19, 1981, at 9.  Originally members of the 
Democratic Party and committed to the New Deal, the “neocons” were appalled by 
the social chaos and radical politics of the New Left.  Although committed to laissez-
faire capitalism, they rejected libertarianism, because, as Kristol argued, “human na-
ture cries out for something more than freedom.  This something is moral direction, 
and the libertarian compass leaves private ethics up to the individual, a situation 
which neoconservatives believe has left capitalism vulnerable to moral anarchy.”  
Grant Havers & Mark Wexler, Is U.S. Neoconservatism Dead?, at http://www.lsus.edu/ 
la/journals/ideology/contents/neoconservatism.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 89 See supra note 88. 
 90 A self-described “cheerful conservative,” Irving Kristol had been a Trotskyist at 
City College of New York and was greatly influenced by Leo Strauss.  IRVING KRISTOL, 
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Podhoretz,92 these “mild conservatives”93 strongly supported the con-
cept of a self-regulating economy, but, unlike other conservatives of 
the era, recognized the need and inevitability of federal government 
programs such as social security and welfare.94  They rejected what 
they perceived as the elitist tendencies and negativity of their coun-
terparts in the other schools of conservatism.95  They were “conserva-
tive” economically, but more “liberal” with respect to fundamental 
social programs. 
Due in part to the influence of the European Christian tradition, 
a tension grew between conservatives’ belief in a laissez-faire economy 
based on ownership of private property, on the one hand, and a pro-
spiritual, anti-materialist theme, on the other.  Leo Strauss, a classical 
political philosopher and leading intellectual of the 1950s, vehe-
mently opposed what he termed the “Machiavellian principles” of 
self-interest and greed.96  Russell Kirk, whose The Conservative Mind97 
served as a catalyst for post-war traditional conservatism,98 scorned not 
only big government, but also the numbing effects of industrial soci-
                                                                                                                                      
NEOCONSERVATISM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 6, 12, 40 (1995).  Kristol became 
an editor at the American Jewish Committee’s publication Commentary, and there he 
met Nathan Glazer.  Id. at 15-17.  He became increasingly critical of the “Left’s pre-
disposition to see Communists as . . . a wayward extremity of the Left, ultimately re-
deemable by therapeutic strategies.”  Id. at 25.  Along with Daniel Bell, Kristol 
founded The Public Interest, which later became associated with the neo-conservative 
movement.  Id. at 29-31.  In the 1960s, Kristol wrote, the “student rebellion and the 
rise of the counterculture, with its messianic expectations and its apocalyptic fears,” 
taught him that he had been a cultural conservative all along.  Id. at 31. 
 91 Nathan Glazer was a veteran of 1950s political uprisings at Harvard and Berke-
ley.  NASH, supra note 4, at 321.  In 1971, Glazer wrote an article entitled The Limits of 
Social Policy, in which he commented that “the breakdown of traditional modes of 
behavior is the chief cause of our social problems” and “some important part of the 
solution of our social problems lies in . . . traditional restraints.”  Id. 
 92 Like Glazer, Podhoretz had been a political liberal in the 1950s but later, simi-
larly disillusioned, Podhoretz became the editor of Commentary, a journal seen by 
many as a rival to the radical New York Review of Books.  NASH, supra note 4, at 327.  
Podhoretz and his colleagues, once “humanistic,” by the 1970s displayed “utter con-
tempt for liberal values.”  Id. 
 93 In an essay written in 1970, Nathan Glazer posed the rhetorical question: 
How does a radical, a mild radical, it is true, but still one who felt closer 
to radical than liberal writers and politicians in the late 1960s, end up a 
conservative, a mild conservative, but still closer to those who call them-
selves conservative than to those who call themselves liberal in early 
1970? 
NATHAN GLAZER, REMEMBERING THE ANSWERS: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN STUDENT 
REVOLT 3 (1970), quoted in NASH, supra note 4, at 321-22 (emphasis added). 
 94 Havers & Wexler, supra note 88. 
 95 Id. 
 96 DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 57, at 28. 
 97 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND (1953). 
 98 NASH, supra note 4, at 69. 
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ety.99  Kirk, who had worked for a “soulless corporation,”100 insisted 
that “[c]onservatism is something more than mere solicitude for tidy 
incomes.”101  Peter Viereck, author of the influential Conservatism Re-
visited,102 emphasized ethics and a reverence for the individual human 
soul over the material fruits of capitalism.103  Viereck’s conservatism, 
he insisted, had “nothing to do with rootless, ‘cash nexus,’ selfish, 
laissez-faire individualism.”104  These conservatives supported a free 
market because they believed it an essential feature of a decentralized 
political system focused on local autonomy and limited government 
intervention in citizens’ lives.105  A recurring theme in this conserva-
tism was a longing for and belief in transcendental values over tran-
sient “materialist” and “scientistic” experience and relativism.106 
The conservative political movement gained great popular mo-
mentum in the late 1970s,107 in the shadow of President Carter’s weak 
economic record, and openly flowered during the 1980s during 
President Ronald Reagan’s two Republican administrations.  In the 
early 1980s, a second generation of “new conservatism” showed up on 
Wall Street and in Washington, dressed in a Burberry trench coat and 
yellow power tie, carrying a briefcase full of get-rich schemes and es-
                                                          
 99 Id. at 69-70. 
 100 Id. at 81. 
 101 RUSSELL KIRK, A PROGRAM FOR CONSERVATIVES 23 (1954), quoted in NASH, supra 
note 4, at 81. 
 102 PETER VIERECK, CONSERVATISM REVISITED (1949). 
 103 NASH, supra note 4, at 66, 81. 
 104 Id. at 81 (quoting PETER VIERECK, SHAME AND GLORY OF THE INTELLECTUALS 248, 
251 (1953)). 
 105 For example, Russell Kirk described his emerging conservative outlook and 
priorities as follows: 
We must have slow but democratic decisions, sound local government, 
diffusion of property-owning, taxation as direct as possible, preserva-
tion of civil liberties, payment of debts by the generation incurring 
them, prevention of the rise of class antipathies, a stable and extensive 
agriculture, as little governing by the government as practicable, and, 
above all, stimulation of self-reliance. 
Id. at 70. 
 106 Friedrich Hayek was one conservative who blamed “scientism” for twentieth 
century totalitarianism.  Hayek believed that the “fallacious application of the meth-
ods of the natural sciences to the moral and social sciences” was at the root of “scien-
tistic hubris” responsible in turn for the concept of inherently collectivist “economic 
planning.”  NASH, supra note 4, at 362. 
 107  Some observers date the birth of modern “market fundamentalism” earlier.  
For example, Professor Benjamin Barber observes that the instruments of democracy 
have failed because they have “been weakened by three decades of market funda-
mentalism, privatization ideology and resentment of government.”  Benjamin R. 
Barber, A Failure of Democracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at A19. 
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pousing a powerful dislike of economic regulation.108  Responding to 
criticisms that traditional conservatives lacked a positive agenda, the 
Republican Party called for a return to past values, back to America’s 
greatness, to “a mythical time of strength,” respect, and self-
reliance.109  One irony of this period is that while the conservatives’ 
idolized political leader, Ronald Reagan, spoke an evocative language 
of the past,110 his leadership, and his alignment with conservative 
economists, helped thrust politics,111 the economy, and conservatism 
itself into a new era.112 
                                                          
 108 Ronald Reagan represented a return to the “traditional ideals” of personal re-
sponsibility and accountability and smaller government, and a conservatism that re-
posed faith in private and local initiatives over federal control.  DUNN & WOODARD, 
supra note 57, at 6, 13. 
 109 Havers & Wexler, supra note 88, at 6-7. 
 110 DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 57, at 6, 13. 
 111 One of the best examples of how the Reagan Revolution changed the political 
landscape is the way it changed Democrats from populists to “new Democrats,” blur-
ring the line between the new parties.  See Rupert Cornwell, Bankrupt Democrats, THE 
INDEP. Aug. 26, 1996, at 13 (observing an “astonishing role reversal” between the two 
major parties, in that “Democrats are champions of the status quo and the darlings of 
Wall Street, while Republicans, touting child tax credits and a 15 per cent across-the 
board tax cut for all, sound more populist than their opponents ever did.”).  See gen-
erally Matthew B. Stein, Something Wicked This Way Comes, Constitutional Transformation 
and the Growing Power of the Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 608-11 (providing 
a helpful summary of the Reagan Revolution, Gingrich Revolution, and Bill Clinton’s 
election). 
 112 As Frank Meyer, a leader in post-World War II American conservatism, might 
have explained, this phenomenon, uncritical reverence of the past, is, in effect, ac-
quiescence to revolution.  In arguing for a “conscious conservatism,” Meyer empha-
sized that in order for conservatism to remain vibrant, and to maintain its reverence 
of human existence, it had to do more than 
appeal simply and uncomplicatedly to the past. . . .  Today’s conserva-
tism cannot simply affirm.  It must select and adjudge.  It is conserva-
tive because in its selection and in its judgment it bases itself upon the 
accumulated wisdom of mankind over millennia, because it accepts the 
limits upon the irresponsible play of untrammeled reason which the 
unchanging values exhibited by that wisdom dictates.  But it is, it has to 
be, not acceptance of what lies before it in the contemporary world, 
but challenge. . . .  To accept is to be not conservative but acquiescent 
to revolution. 
MEYER, supra note 35, at 20. 
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Conservative Schizophrenia113 
A thorough examination of the changes in political conservatism 
in the last two decades of the twentieth century is beyond the scope 
of this analysis, but some of the relevant ones include: 
• the deeply-rooted romance with individualism and self-
determination lost its blush, waned, and was replaced by 
an unabashed love affair with “bigness”114 and power;115 
• considerations of morality and traditionalism, while still 
paid lip service by conservatives, gave way to an apparent 
                                                          
 113 Other writers have used the term “schizophrenia” in connection with conserva-
tive thought.  For example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., called the conservatism of the 
1950s the “politics of nostalgia,” accusing the new right of misapplying the concepts 
of Burkean conservatism, which was merely “the ethical afterglow” of feudalism, to a 
society characterized by a “nonaristocratic, dynamic, progressive” business structure.  
NASH, supra note 4, at 137.  Russell Kirk, Schlesinger implied, was “schizophrenic” in 
trying to fuse Burkean concepts with American laissez-faire.  Id. at 137-38.   
 114 Concerns with the expanding size of corporations—”bigness”—existed early in 
the twentieth century.  “Although everyone was concerned about bigness, no consen-
sus existed on whether size was an evil per se, or only when utilized for ‘unfair’ ad-
vantage.”  Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1216-17 (1986). 
 115 Not all conservatives embrace the value of efficient production above all other 
values.  In fact, anxiety that “the cultural effects of the market will erode” traditional 
values is “the most consistent tension within conservative social and political 
thought.”  Muller, supra note 4, at 19.  A number of modern conservative writers have 
weighed in on the unfortunate, unintended consequences of out-of-control capital-
ism, citing such effects as splintered families and the destruction of tight-knit com-
munities.  For example, in an interview with Dinesh D’Souza, Professor Gertrude 
Himmelfarb observed that America’s economic and technological gains have ex-
tracted steep costs, stating that while “[e]conomically, our society is better off[,] . . . 
in many ways we are a much poorer society than we used to be.  There are other 
forms of poverty than economic poverty.”  DINESH D’SOUZA, THE VIRTUE OF 
PROSPERITY: FINDING VALUES IN AN AGE OF TECHNO-AFFLUENCE 40 (2000).  Conservative 
commentator George Will has averred that capitalism challenges conservative beliefs 
because it “undermines traditional social structures and values.”  GEORGE WILL, THE 
PURSUIT OF VIRTUE AND OTHER TORY NOTIONS 6 (1982).  In DANIEL BELL, THE 
CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21-22, 70-74 (1976), author Daniel Bell 
explored the irony resulting from capitalism’s success: a hedonistic culture whose 
values undermine the “Protestant ethic” of industry and thrift that produced it.  In a 
similar vein, David Bosworth posits that rampant consumerism, in addition to being a 
“destroyer of maturity and [an] endless generator of new psychic needs,” yields the 
ethic of the “Efficient Producer,” according to which parenting and home life occur 
in step with the “grimly anxious pace of the post-modern workplace,” causing family 
relations to be “stripped of wonder, curiosity, and improvisational fun.”  David Bos-
worth, The Spirit of Capitalism, 2000, PUB. INT., Winter 2000, at 24.  The result is that 
we are squeezed between “demands for perfect efficiency and unending appetite,” 
living “an impoverished definition of human life.”  Id. at 25-26. 
 On the inverse relationship between wealth accumulation and contentment, 
see ROBERT E. LANE, THE LOSS OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES (2000). 
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“religion” of soulless “market analysis,” based on a bible 
written by pro-business efficiency116 wonks and market 
fundamentalists;117 and, 
• the emphasis on local control and decision-making was 
overwhelmed by burgeoning economic federalization.118 
The “large corporation,” steadily growing since the turn of the 
century, became the “mega-corporation,” as the Republican admini-
strations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush,119 in 
                                                          
 116 Efficiency can be defined in many ways.  Generally, efficiency in law is a ten-
dency to minimize waste.  Hon. Stephen F. Williams, What is the “Law” in Law and 
Economics, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 39 (1997).  It can also be defined in the 
“Kaldor-Hicks . . . sense, in which a policy change is said to be efficient . . . if the win-
ners gain more from the change than the losers lose.”  WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 16 (1987).  Efficiency 
also has been equated to Pareto superiority, in which no parties are losers.  Anthony 
T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 227 
(1980). 
 Galbraith called the obsession of economists with efficiency a 
“near fetish,” though in the beginning, there was a strong humanitar-
ian basis for this preoccupation.  Until the nineteenth century, grind-
ing poverty had at all times and in nearly all places been the fate of all 
but a minority of mankind.  For the relief of this poverty, nothing 
could be quite so important as to get more production from existing 
manpower and resources. 
GALBRAITH, supra note 5, at 24. 
 117 “Market fundamentalism” as used herein denotes a political/economic phi-
losophy emphasizing the goal of pure laissez-faire, driven by a belief in the transcen-
dent value of efficiency.  See Kuttner, supra note 8 (discussing the confluence of the 
Chicago School’s belief that “efficient outcomes are just the aggregation of selfish 
private interests” and Enron, which “epitomized an entire philosophy about the sup-
posed self-cleansing of markets”); George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open 
Society Endangered (Dec. 10, 1998) (equating the term with laissez faire but preferring 
to use “market fundamentalism because laissez faire is a French expression and most 
market fundamentalists don’t speak French”), at http://www.geocities.com/ ecocor-
ner/intelarea/gs6.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).  The term is synonymous with 
“the First Way,” or “the traditional Adam Smith, laissez-faire approach of minimalist 
government intervention for the unimpaired operation of the free market in a capi-
talist society.”  Raymond J. Friel, Blair’s Third Way-Thatcher’s Enduring Legacy, 48 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 861, 861, 883-84 (2000) (defining the “Second Way” as the failed “oppo-
site extreme,” involving maximum government control to benefit the greater good of 
society, and the “Third Way”—represented by the views of Bill Clinton and Tony 
Blair—as “reduction in governmental interference to the amount appropriate to sat-
isfy the needs of society”). 
 118 See Kingman Brewster, Jr., The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (Edward S. Mason, ed. 1959) [hereinafter 
MODERN SOCIETY]. 
 119 The effects of these two presidents’ policies will be felt for years to come.  
Reagan and Bush filled two-thirds of the nation’s federal judgeships, which was 
the greatest retooling of the federal courts since Franklin Roosevelt’s 
presidency.  The Reagan and Bush Administrations tried to transform 
the judiciary’s ideology by appointing individuals who, among other 
traits, doubted the efficacy of government intervention in the market    
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efforts to aid American firms in global competition,120 loosened re-
strictions on mergers,121 thereby accelerating restructuring of markets 
through combination.  Led by the Chicago School’s economic the-
                                                                                                                                      
. . . .  The impact of Reagan/Bush judicial selection will endure well 
into the [twenty-first century].  To some courtwatchers, this prospect is 
ominous.  In assessing what he terms “conservative court-packing,” Pro-
fessor Herman Schwartz states that “in order to favor business, Reagan 
judges Robert Bork, Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook and other 
right-wing antitrust specialists have encouraged judicial interpretations 
of the antitrust and other regulatory laws that conflict with the clear 
congressional intent.” 
William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appointments and the Future of Antitrust Policy, 7 SPG 
ANTITRUST 8, 8 (1993) (paragraph structure omitted). 
 120 Steve Lohr of the New York Times described the force driving this shift: 
[It is] the new economics of global competition, stagnating productiv-
ity, slow growth and high inflation.  With strong foreign competitors, 
especially Japan and West Germany, now grabbing big shares of such 
domestic markets as autos, steel, electronics, and chemicals, it is be-
coming clear that national boundaries no longer define the real com-
petitive market in many industries.  Thus traditional antitrust measures 
of economic concentration in home markets no longer seem to apply. 
Steve Lohr, Antitrust: Big Business Breathes Easier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1981, at C2.  
More recently, Sakakibara Eisuke, Japan’s Vice Minister of Finance for International 
Affairs, described “the post Thatcher-Reagan dominance of market fundamentalism 
with the rapidly advancing globalization that has engulfed the entire world, includ-
ing emerging countries” and posed the question “whether the surge of market fun-
damentalism during the last two decades or so would prove to be as unsustainable as 
the laissez-faire of the gold standard period.”  Sakakibara Eisuke, The End of Market 
Fundamentalism, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 5, 1999, available at http://www.asiaweek.com 
/asiaweek/99/0205/feat8.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 121 Influenced by conservative economic theory emanating from the Chicago 
School, as well as Judge Robert H. Bork’s THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF (1978), President Reagan made several key appointments designed to 
cut back on traditional antitrust enforcement, including William F. Baxter, as Associ-
ate Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and James 
C. Miller III, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.  Stuart Auerbach, A Con-
servative Economist Will Get FTC Nomination, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1982, at D10.  An-
other key appointment was John S.R. Shad as chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.  Robert Pear, Clarifying Some Mixed Signals on Antitrust Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 1981, at D4. 
Before his appointment to the Justice Department, William Baxter was a law pro-
fessor at Stanford.  He promised to “turn back the clock” on antitrust enforcement.  
Howard Kurtz, Justice Shifts Antitrust Responsibilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1986, at D9.  
His replacement in 1985, Douglas H. Ginsburg, strongly believed in market self-
correction and complete deregulation.  Todd S. Purdum, Nominee Not Expected to Alter 
Antitrust Unit, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1985, at D2. 
James C. Miller III was the first chairman in the “history of the FTC to ask Con-
gress to curb his agency’s power.”  Auerbach, supra.  He sought to limit the agency’s 
authority to act on behalf of consumers in the “areas of unfair and deceptive advertis-
ing.”  Id.  Miller had a “single-minded determination to undo . . . the very foundation 
of antitrust and consumer protection law laid down by Congress.”  Champion of the 
Free Market: James Clifford Miller 3d, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1985, at A7 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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ory,122 the Reagan Administration took antitrust enforcement “back to 
the basics”123 by deciding not to oppose vertical restraints on trade 
and to oppose horizontal restraints only when they measurably af-
fected efficiency.  Reagan’s first attorney general, William French 
Smith, declared that “bigness in business does not necessarily mean 
badness . . . [;] efficient forms should not be hobbled under the guise 
of antitrust enforcement.”124  At the same time, the Department of Jus-
tice instituted antitrust suits against city governments, poverty lawyers, 
and labor unions, insisting that classic economic doctrine required 
antitrust enforcement in all areas of economic activity.125 
 Meanwhile, the individual and small business took a back seat 
to corporate interests.126  The consumer movement of the 1960s and 
                                                          
 122 The theories of the influential Chicago School and its derivative schools of 
thought are familiar.  See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).  In 1962, Milton Friedman revived the argu-
ment that free market capitalism is essential to a free society.  See MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (2d ed. 1982).  Invoking “liberalism” in its nineteenth cen-
tury sense, Friedman argued that efficiency was valuable primarily “as a means to 
maximize individual freedom.”  Carolyn B. Kuhl, Introduction: Law, Economics, and 
Social Conservatism, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 57 (1997).  Friedman perceived 
two routes to efficiency, the totalitarian state or voluntary exchanges between people; 
he believed that the latter was preferable because it did not interfere with freedom.  
Id. 
Professor Lawrence Anthony Sullivan of the University of California at Berkeley 
stated that the Reagan Administration’s decision not to challenge vertical restraints 
under the Sherman Act represented “a decision not to enforce a well-established 
area of the law.”  Pear, supra note 121.  As Sullivan put it, the Administration was “try-
ing to turn antitrust law into applied Chicago School economic theory and, in doing 
so, [has] drastically oversimplified many problems.” Id.  Under this policy, corporate 
size did not matter, so long as efficiency prevailed, even though “antitrust enforce-
ment along economic lines . . . incorporates large doses of hunch, faith and intui-
tion.”  Mergers’ Meaning: Good or Greed?, WASH. POST, July 19, 1981, at F1. 
 123 Pear, supra note 121. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Michael Isikoff, “Chicago School” Catches a Taxi: FTC Shifting Antitrust Activity 
from Big Business to Novel Areas, WASH. POST, June 17, 1984, at G1.  As Isikoff reported, 
the FTC had approved Texaco’s purchase of Getty Oil and Standard Oil’s acquisition 
of Gulf Oil while at the same time: 
• suing cities for regulating taxis; 
• instituting suits against a small D.C. lawyer’s group representing the poor 
for engaging in a two-week strike to pressure the city for higher fees; 
• investigating forty state regulatory boards for such actions as restricting ad-
vertising by professionals; 
• investigating the Screen Actors Guild and the American Federation of Tele-
vision and Radio Artists for trying to keep non-union actors out of adver-
tisements. 
 126 Consumers, in particular, fell to the bottom of the ladder.  Ronald Reagan ap-
pointed Terrence M. Scanlon Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion.  Scanlon stated that his policy was to avoid conflict with business by seeking to 
reach agreements.  Other commissioners identified him as an “incompetent deregu-
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1970s127 had already waned, and the Reagan Administration’s “green 
light” to combination brought bad news for smaller commercial par-
ties.128  Accused by conservatives of lacking intellectual rigor, antitrust 
enforcers, once motivated in part by the sense that fair competition 
required the continued existence of smaller businesses,129 abandoned 
that notion completely, in favor of the ideal of efficiency.130  In the 
                                                                                                                                      
lator.”  Irvin Molotsky, A Case of Memorandums at Ten Pages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1985, 
at A8. 
 127 As noted in HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES 
PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 101, at 128 (1986), throughout the twentieth 
century, until the 1960s, courts were “notorious[ly] . . . insensitiv[e] to consumer in-
terests.”  In 1968, with passage of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, Congress began 
fashioning statutory protections and remedies in areas long calling for attention.  Id.  
The  broad acceptance of the UCC led consumer activists in the 1960s and 1970s “to 
propose . . . model laws to regulate consumer sales transactions.”  Id. § 102, at 130.  
Among model acts proposed were the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act; the 
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; the Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer 
Protection Law; and various versions of “consumer fraud acts.”  Id. §§ 102-107, at 130-
37.  For an interesting history of earlier phases of the consumer movement, see Mar-
tha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9 (2000). 
 128 See Macaulay, supra note 36, at 636.  Regarding cases selected for his and Marc 
Galanter’s contracts casebook, Professor Macaulay writes: 
. . . [W]e emphasize the counterrevolution that began when Chief Jus-
tice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues were voted off the California 
court.  We stress that the hill is steeper and harder to climb.  Much the 
same can be said about the consumer protection cases that we offer.  
Those from the era of Ralph Nader and the consumer movement find 
plaintiffs successfully climbing the mountain.  More recent decisions 
that we give students in a supplement involve plaintiffs attacking rent-
to-own with hidden high interest rates.  These plaintiffs tend to lose.  
The book over and over stresses cost barriers to litigation. 
Id. 
 129 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 907-08 (1999) (foot-
notes omitted). 
[In debating the Sherman Act], Congress also expressed concern for 
preserving business opportunities for small firms.  The opportunity to 
compete has been viewed as particularly important for small entrepre-
neurs, perhaps because of their vulnerability to predatory activities. . . .  
Judicial statements of congressional intention to assist small businesses 
have been frequent.  Courts have even occasionally viewed congres-
sional interest in protecting small businesses as overriding its con-
sumer-oriented goals. 
Id. 
 130 See William J. Baer & David A. Balto, Public Choice: Do Politics Corrupt Antitrust 
Enforcement?  The Politics of Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
113, 120 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
Federal antitrust enforcement has changed considerably since the early 
1970s.  The main shift in focus has been that rigorous economic analy-
sis of markets and competition has become the norm for both the 
agencies and the courts.  Scholarly research, much of it initiated by the 
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ensuing era of mergers and takeovers, the layers of complex bureauc-
racy in corporate America increasingly rivaled those in government, 
which seemed to illustrate prophetic metaphors made earlier in the 
twentieth century131 by such scholars as Arthur Selwyn Miller132 that 
compared the modern corporation to a private or quasi-
government.133 
By this time, the political term “liberalism” had lost its associa-
tion with libertarianism and had taken on a new connotation stem-
ming from its link to the “counter-culture,” the social and political 
phenomenon that engendered neo-conservatism.134 Moreover, con-
servatism had distanced itself from its once-central belief in the pri-
macy of individual rights and liberties.  To the new conservatives, the 
“person” that seemingly had come to assume the most importance 
and possess the greatest rights was the large corporation. 
The Ascendancy of Materialism as a Conservative Value 
Perhaps the most puzzling contradiction arising from the mod-
ern conservative message is the emphasis on morality, temperance, 
and traditionalism versus the prevailing preoccupation with evaluat-
ing both public and private actions in microeconomic terms, which 
are explicitly divorced from deeper evaluative judgments.  Under this 
scheme, moral leadership properly is confined to community and “in-
termediary” social institutions,135 whereas in business, economic fun-
damentalism—the goal of pure laissez-faire—rules.  Consequently, 
and predictably, unbridled greed and self-interest drive the economic 
sector,136 and, unfortunately, the morality and ethics purportedly 
                                                                                                                                      
“Chicago School,” exposed the inconsistencies and sloppiness of some 
prior antitrust thinking.  Today, courts and antitrust enforcers rely 
much less on structural presumptions and more on the consumer wel-
fare standard of anticompetitive harm.  A case will not be filed unless 
there is a compelling anticompetitive justification.  The result is a body 
of law that relies on certain core principles of neoclassical economic 
theory and that has widespread political support. 
Id. 
 131 Brewster, supra note 118, at 72. 
 132 See, e.g., ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE 
GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1976). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 135 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 877. 
 136 “There is always greed and misconduct in the business world,” notes Seth 
Taube, formerly an enforcement chief with the SEC and now head of the securities 
litigation practice at the law firm of McCarter & English, “[b]ut in today’s society, 
more people tend to believe they can get away with it.”  Strauss, supra note 16.  Peter 
Drucker agrees: “That extreme greed at the top is new . . . .”  Id. 
 137 The Institute for America’s Future published a report estimating that the col-
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taught and practiced in social institutions inadequately temper the 
devastation wrought in the marketplace.  The rest of society pays the 
price137 for this schizophrenic compartmentalization. 
In addition to their allegiance to a laissez-faire ideal, conserva-
tives traditionally have united in the conviction that human character 
develops best on a foundation of hard work, sacrifice, and self-
denial.138  They have sought to ensure survival of traditional culture, 
values, and morality.139  Philosophically, they have stood against the 
crass materialism of American culture and lamented the ways in 
which capitalism has undermined the morals that once gave Ameri-
can society a stable foundation. 
 But reservations about the consequences of unregulated capi-
talism, articulated by both old and new conservatives,140 have not 
found their way into public policy or political reality.  Riding the 
popular wave of Efficiency Doctrine and market fundamentalism, 
corporate interests have displaced certain strands of conservative 
                                                                                                                                      
lapse of twelve large corporations resulted in a loss in the value of individual retire-
ment accounts of over $175 billion, a combined loss in stock value of $309 billion, 
and a loss of over 87,000 jobs.  The loss in state public pension funds was at least 
$6.44 billion.  American Family Voices, The Cost of Corporate Recklessness (study on file 
with the author). 
 138 Converative Daniel Bell explains that Adam Smith’s brand of capitalism meant 
being parsimonious and frugal.  BELL, supra note 115, at 69.  He writes, “early in the 
development of capitalism, the unrestrained economic impulse was held in check by 
Puritan restraint and the Protestant ethic” of virtue, hard work, and the building of a 
“character structure.”  Id. at 20-21.  Human character needs this structure, according 
to traditional conservatism’s touchstone principles, including the “realist” recogni-
tion that human nature is frail, imperfect, and selfish, subject to corruption, even 
animalistic in its pursuit of self-interest.  See JOHN KEKES, A CASE FOR CONSERVATISM 
41-42 (1998).  Kekes claims that conservatives are skeptical about the prospect of 
changing the human character, thus the human condition.  Id.  Conservative think-
ing, he writes, has been called the “poltics of imperfection.”  Id.  The adherents to 
this theory recognize not just a human propensity for evil, for this is just a manifesta-
tion of a more pervasive contingency, a complex mix of genetic and social factors 
which give rise to expression and manifestations of evil, over which human beings 
and the political institutions which they create have little control.  Id. 
 139 Edmund Burke believed that society was a contract between generations, “a 
partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”  EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON 
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 61 (L.G. Mitchell ed., 1993). 
 140 See, e.g., KRISTOL, supra note 90, at 211-12; supra notes 76-106 and accompany-
ing text; supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 141 For example, at one point management of Western Resources threatened to 
pull out of Kansas if regulators did not act favorably on a merger proposal.  A 
spokesperson for the company said, “The fact that customers are likely to benefit 
from $7 billion in cost savings is rarely discussed . . . .  Consumers need to under-
stand the magnitude of the cost savings involved here.”  Jim McLean, Western Threat-
ens to Leave, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Aug. 4, 1999.  The projected savings never materialized; 
the merger collapsed under the pressure of Western’s falling stock prices. 
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thought with more simplistic and profitable messages.  One such 
message, repeatedly asserted in the Western Resources case,141 goes 
like this: Large corporations are good for you.  You need them, because they 
make the products and services you require and desire more accessible and af-
fordable (it’s economies of scale, stupid).  This merger/friendly acquisi-
tion/hostile takeover we propose will increase efficiency so you will have more 
choice, more freedom as consumers.  Your lives will improve if the deal goes 
through.  Corporate representatives and their cheerleaders cast these 
propositions in altruistic terms, like seasoned politicians, as if they 
were merely responding to public need and would not have worked 
so tirelessly to consummate the transaction if they did not care deeply 
about the small players of the world, their beloved constituents. 
If these sorts of claims proved true, then proponents of unregu-
lated big business could claim the high ground.  A broad spectrum of 
goals would be satisfied, including economic efficiency, fair pricing, 
and consumer benefit.  But the Reagan Revolution and conservative 
interpretation of antitrust law, political and economic dominance by 
huge corporate conglomerates, and the watering down of consumer 
protection considered together raise questions respecting where 
modern political conservatives stand on issues that once comprised 
core tenets of the conservative outlook.  These tenets include the 
economic independence of the individual, local control rather than 
federalization of the economy,142 and spirituality over materialism.  Is 
                                                          
 142 See Brewster, supra note 118, at 72-84. 
 143 Conservative Dinesh D’Souza writes gushingly of the phenomenon of techno-
affluence: 
I have mentioned, but neglected to discuss, the most obvious new as-
pect of the new economy: money!  Being filthy rich is fashionable 
again.  As late as the 1980s, it was okay to have a lot of money as long as 
you inherited it or built it up over many years.  Old money was better 
than new money. . . .  But now prejudice against self-made wealth has 
completely evaporated.  Now new money is better than old money, be-
cause it means that you actually earned it. . . .  New money means that 
it has to be on display and out in the open, which wasn’t the case be-
fore. . . .  The insides of these homes are sumptuous: chandeliers be-
dazzle, a marble floor adorns the entryway, some sort of art and wine 
collection is mandatory, hand-painted murals and walk-in playhouses 
are nice touches for the child’s room, and the sheets in the master 
guest bedrooms are Egyptian cotton and cost in the range of $2,000 for 
a set.  A little imagination is always appreciated: Limited chairman Les-
lie Wexner has a dining table that after meals descends into a subter-
ranean kitchen, where the staff can clear the plates. 
DINESH D’SOUZA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY: FINDING VALUES IN AN AGE OF TECHNO-
AFFLUENCE 10, 14 (2000) (paragraph structure omitted).  D’Souza’s theme is that the 
traditional distinction between conservatives and liberals has given way to a new dis-
tinction based on attitudes toward the “new economy” and material wealth.  Id. at 28-
29.  He labels those in favor of unlimited wealth acquisition as the Party of Yeah and 
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there any place in today’s economic picture for the re-emergence of 
conditions that promote traditional conservative values? 
 In the realm of public policy, when conservatives face a choice 
between backing up conservative non-economic ideology—the sur-
vival of traditional culture, the promotion of non-materialist values—
or furthering the economic agenda, they seem to choose the latter, 
and there now exists an entire jurisprudential framework—law and 
economics—to support why.  Fundamentalist economic theory, which 
emphasizes efficiency to the exclusion of other values, spilled over 
from academia to politics in the 1980s and continues to drive conser-
vative political dialogue and policy.  One of the results is an obses-
sively consumerist culture,143 in which acquisition of material wealth is 
treated as a measure of one’s patriotism—a value directly at odds with 
the traditional conservative belief in spiritualism over materialism. 
Market fundamentalists proffer many reasons to support the 
goal of economic efficiency through untempered growth: (1) because 
capitalism has proven the best economic system available, its engines 
are to be treated with deference;144 (2) in order to compete globally, 
American corporations must combine to become sufficiently large 
and powerful to control market share internationally;145 (3) growth 
ordinarily increases efficiency, and efficiency, rather than wealth dis-
tribution, is the primary goal of antitrust regulation;146 and (4) the 
                                                                                                                                      
those who are skeptical about the new economy, the Party of Nay.  Id. 
 144 Abundant expressions of this belief exist both in popular media and in classic 
works.  For example, in a speech on corporate responsibility, Earnie Davenport, 
Chairman and CEO of Eastman Chemical Company, wanted to get the message out 
that “that capitalism is the best system in the world for maximizing the value of tech-
nology, for maximizing the value of knowledge, and for maximizing the value of the 
human mind and spirit.”  Earnie Davenport, Unleashing the Power of the Human Mind 
and Spirit: The Promise of Capitalism, EXECUTIVE SPEECHES, Feb. 1, 1997, at 28.  Ludwig 
von Mises contended that “all intermediate forms of social organization were ‘un-
availing,’ and that socialism too was ultimately ‘unworkable’”; therefore “capitalism is 
the only feasible system of social organization based on the division of labor.”  John 
Bellamy Foster, Contradictions in the Universalization of Capitalism, MONTHLY REV., Apr. 
1, 1999, at 29.  See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); ADAM 
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776); James Ottavio Castag-
nera, Groping Toward Utopia: Capitalism, Utopia, and Rawls’ Theory of Public Policy, 11 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 297 (2002). 
 145 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 168-71 (arguing that Reagan-Bush pro-merger poli-
cies marked “a more-or-less permanent transition in antitrust philosophy designed to 
accommodate the global integration of . . . markets”). 
 146 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 121, at 6. 
 147 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at F33.  Friedman argued that corporations had no business 
trying to divine what constitutes “public interest” and that they could serve society 
best by pursuit of private profit.  Id.; cf. William Graham Sumner, The Concentration of 
Wealth: Its Economic Justification, in SOCIAL DARWINISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF WILLIAM 
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corporation’s only legitimate goal is profit maximization, and profits 
increase with size.147 
Legitimate as these objectives might be, conservatives must rec-
ognize, in accord with the principles of prudence and intergenera-
tional responsibility, that they should not be pursued at the exclusion 
of broader goals or with a focus solely on the short-term.  That ap-
proach contravenes the traditional conservative trust in existing ar-
rangements and suspicion of change.  Traditionally, conservatives 
have believed that human experience teaches new generations what 
has worked and what has failed and that the lessons of the past are 
transmitted to the future in the form of prevailing conditions, which 
are presumptively superior to speculative revision of those condi-
tions.148  In the admittedly laudable effort to maintain American 
dominance, and in their related allegiance to Efficiency Doctrine, 
modern conservatives have recently appeared willing to sacrifice the 
very conditions that promote cornerstone conservative values, such as 
preservation of local communities over nationalization,149 economic 
                                                                                                                                      
GRAHAM SUMNER 151-52 (1963).  Sumner wrote: 
Industry may be republican; it never can be democratic, so long as men 
differ in productive power and in industrial virtue.  In our time joint 
stock companies, which are in form republican, are drifting over into 
oligarchies or monarchies because one of a few get greater efficiency of 
control and greater vigor of administration.  They direct the enterprise 
in a way which produces more, or more economically.  This is the pur-
pose for which the organization exists and success in it outweighs eve-
rything else. 
Id. 
 148 John Kekes observes that conservatives are motivated by enjoyment of valued 
conditions and the fear of losing those conditions, and believe that continued exis-
tence of conditions argues for their inherent value.  KEKES, supra note 138, at 6-9.  
Russell Kirk concluded that change must be based on experience, history and tradi-
tion, rather than arising from prescriptive rules.  DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 57, at 
29.  “Raymond English sees conservatives as clinging to the known and accustomed” 
and, in politics, stressing the value of tradition and authority.  Id. at 33.  Ronald Lora 
views conservatives as desiring “to preserve custom and opposing change” that might 
disrupt it.  Id.  Clinton Rossiter holds that conservatives oppose substantial societal 
change and “seek to defend personal acquisitions, value community, and subscribe 
to principles designed to justify the established order.”  Id. 
 149 William Peterman remarks that the linkage of empowerment and local control 
only occurs among progressive advocates of community-based economic develop-
ment.  He argues that empowerment is actually an amorphous term that has differ-
ent meanings depending on one’s political orientation: For conservatives it means 
“ownership”; for liberals it means “access to government”; and for progressives it 
means “community control.”  WILLIAM PETERMAN, NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF GRASSROOTS ACTION 
37 (2000). 
 150 But see KEKES, supra note 138, at 36-37 (arguing that putting individual auton-
omy first raises serious problems). 
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self-determination, individualism,150 and anti-materialism. 
III. MODERN CONSERVATIVES’ MISGUIDED SUPPORT OF CORPORATE 
POWER AND THE CONSEQUENTIAL DIMINUTION IN INDIVIDUAL POWER 
The Laissez-Faire Myth 
Despite evidence that rules help temper the negative effects of 
corporate overreaching on other segments of society, modern con-
servatives argue that a healthy, productive economy results from free 
markets and minimal or no government regulation.151  Two conflict-
ing forces appear to drive this view: nostalgia for a mythical past in 
which individuals controlled their economic destinies without gov-
ernment interference, and fear of a future in which America may lose 
global marketplace supremacy and therefore political dominance. 
Conservatives who oppose economic regulation adhere to what 
they perceive to be the competitive model envisioned by Adam 
Smith,152 in which the economy self-regulates on the basis of supply 
and demand, and consumers act as rational maximizers of their per-
                                                          
 151 See, e.g., DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 57, at 56 (“Along with the sanctity of pri-
vate property, most conservatives adhere to the view that laissez-faire capitalism is the 
best economic system.”); NASH, supra note 4, at 13, 245.  But cf. KRISTOL, supra note 
90, at 211-12 (believing that although the founding fathers intended the United 
States to be “capitalist,” both they and Adam Smith “would have been perplexed by 
the kind of capitalism we have in 1978.”). 
 152 Adam Smith posited that economic activity was co-extensive with the sphere of 
freedom, and that the pursuit of self-interest, when subject to the laws of the market-
place, yielded efficient and socially beneficial results, whereas government, which was 
subject to artificial human laws, was naturally coercive.  BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 7.  
See generally SMITH, supra note 144. 
 153 Professor Paul Stephen Dempsey explains market theory as follows: 
Capitalists, by investing in the means of production . . . satiate con-
sumer demands for goods and services.  Consumers, acting as rational 
maximizers of their own personal interests, cast dollar votes of approval 
by the purchase of goods and services they desire most, thereby reward-
ing entrepreneurs who satisfy their wants.  Profits provide a motivation 
for entrepreneurs to seek out and satisfy these consumer desires. . . .  
Under this theory, the community’s interest is best served by allowing 
competitive market forces to determine prices, for in a fully competi-
tive environment pricing approaches marginal costs, or the costs to so-
ciety of the next additional unit of production.  Scarce resources are 
distributed by the ‘invisible hands’ of the market system to their high-
est valued use.  Classic economic theory embraces the premise that op-
timum efficiency is achieved when the world’s resources are allocated 
in a way that maximizes the welfare of consumers, as measured by their 
preferences in the marketplace. 
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political 
Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1, 11 (1989). 
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sonal interests.  Classical economic theory153 certainly possesses logic 
and appeal: society is an aggregate of individuals; individuals, driven 
by ego, act out of rational self-interest, and thus can best determine 
the most expedient means to self-enrichment.  Individuals acting ra-
tionally in pursuit of self-interest reap the optimal benefit for them-
selves and society.  The theory operates symmetrically, from con-
sumer to producer, and from producer to consumer.  In order to 
maximize his self-interest, the producer must please the consumer; 
the seller’s interest in repeat business and reputation will mold his 
conduct to conform with consumer benefit.154  In order to enrich 
himself, the consumer will select the products best suiting his needs.  
But this model of “perfect competition” rests on a “carefully circum-
scribed set of assumptions,” among them, that consumers possess 
perfect information, no single producer has market power, and dis-
tribution of wealth is irrelevant.155  Unfortunately, none of these as-
sumptions is firmly grounded in real world practice. 
History teaches that regulation to correct free market imperfec-
tions is essential.  As Vermont Royster described: 
[R]egulation to protect consumers is almost as old as civilization 
itself.  Tourists to the ruins of Pompeii see an early version of the 
bureau of weights and measures, a place where the townsfolk 
could go to be sure they weren’t cheated by the local tradesmen.  
Unfortunately, a little larceny is too common in the human      
species. 
  So regulation in some form or other is one of the prices we 
                                                          
 154 Some commentators claim concern for reputation still keeps companies in 
line.  E.g., Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 755 (2000) (“Parties to a contract are almost never 
anonymous.  In almost all contracts, one party or both parties care deeply about their 
reputations”; and “Most retailers offer warranties and honor them because they fear 
damage to their reputation.”). 
But John C. Coffee, Jr., Guarding the Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2002, at A17, 
writes with respect to the policing power of concern for reputation, in a broader con-
text: 
These ongoing cases [of corporate and auditor fraud] reveal the fallacy 
of a concept that had become enshrined in judicial orthodoxy by the 
early 1990’s: the idea that it would be irrational for professional gate-
keepers to engage in fraud because they are pledging their reputations, 
built over years of decades, in vouching for the financial statements or 
management strategies of their clients.  Since the gatekeeper serves 
many clients, according to this theory, it would not sacrifice its reputa-
tion to please any single client. 
Id. 
 155 Dempsey, supra note 153, at 11. 
 156 Vermont Royster, ‘Regulation’ Isn’t a Dirty Word, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1987, at 
A32. 
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pay for our complex civilization.  And the more complicated soci-
ety becomes, the more need for some watching over its many 
parts.  We shouldn’t forget that a great deal of the regulation we 
encounter today in business or in our personal lives arose from a 
recognized need in the past.156 
Even in the nineteenth century, which conservatives cite as an 
example of functioning laissez-faire,157 adherents to a market-
controlled economy themselves admitted that government interven-
tion was necessary to protect businesses from “excessively competi-
tive” practices.158  Although in the decades before the Civil War, ten-
sions existed among various business interests, including producers, 
warehousers, provisioners, and other middlemen, after the war, the 
level of political and economic unrest grew to a new level of inten-
sity.159  Rail transportation dramatically altered the economic land-
scape.  As a consequence of westward expansion, the economic inter-
dependency of the various commercial players in the chain from 
producer to consumer grew, was recognized, and resulted in “vicious 
struggles” among the rail carriers,160 who “were anything but staunch 
advocates” of pure competition.161  “In this boiling cauldron of self-
interest,” the largest commercial parties—the railroads—were the 
strongest supporters of government intervention.162 
 Thus, rather than rejecting government intervention in un-
equivocal support of pure laissez-faire, the large commercial entities 
                                                          
 157 See Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the 
United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 580 (1994) (“One of the 
myths of U.S. history is that governments followed a laissez-faire approach to business 
in the nineteenth-century.  In fact the governments, at all levels, during this devel-
opment period were extremely active in business affairs.”). 
 158 Rabin, supra note 114, at 1192. 
 159 Id. at 1194. 
 160 Id. at 1198. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 1199-1200. 
 163 Commentators naturally vary in their descriptions of the American regulatory 
eras.  For example, Professor Paul Stephen Dempsey describes three eras of regula-
tory proliferation, designated Origins of Economic and Antitrust Regulation (1897-
1914); The Great Depression and the New Deal (the 1930s); and The New Frontier 
and Great Society (1960s and 1970s).  Dempsey, supra note 153, at 13-14.  Professor 
Deborah A. Ballam, after describing the early nineteenth century as “hotbeds of 
regulatory activity,” also describes three phases of federal government regulation of 
business: Phase I (1877-1917): Establishing the Role of Government; Phase II (1917-
1945): Implementing the Approach of Regulation to Business; and Phase III (1945-
present): The New Regulation.  Ballam, supra note 157, at 598-637.  Professor Robert 
Rabin adopts a slightly different approach, perceiving clear eras of regulation in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and labels his seven periods Populist, Progres-
sive, World War I, New Deal, post-New Deal, Great Society, and Public Interest.  
Rabin, supra note 114, at 1191. 
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of the late nineteenth century stimulated the first of several waves of 
federal regulation163 designed to correct the harmful public effects of 
market imperfections.  Federal regulatory reform began in 1887 with 
Congress’s creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose 
purpose was to address monopoly abuses by the railroads.164  A second 
period of reform came in the Great Depression with the increased 
regulation of public interest industries, such as transportation and 
energy, and the creation of federal agencies designed to regulate 
business, including the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),165 and the National La-
bor Relations Board (“NLRB”).166  Another discrete era of regulation 
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, as policymakers responded to a 
wide variety of environmental and safety concerns that the private 
sector had not addressed.167  Each of the three cycles of regulatory ac-
tivity in the twentieth century occurred as a response to the inability 
of the market to satisfy public policy imperatives, which are not fur-
thered naturally in the marketplace.168 
 Unfortunately, regulation has not been unequivocally positive 
for consumers either.  The reality is that carefully tailored and admin-
istered regulation and recent deregulation of “infrastructure indus-
tries,” such as communications, transportation, and energy, have both 
                                                          
 164 Dempsey, supra note 153, at 13. 
 165 Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934 to en-
force newly passed securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934.  Creation of the SEC, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Comm’n Official Site, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2004).  The 1933 Act had two basic objectives, to require that investors 
received financial and other significant information concerning securities being of-
fered for public sale; and to prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in 
the sale of securities.  Id.  The 1934 Act created the SEC, authorizing it to register, 
regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies as well 
as the nation’s securities self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), such as the New 
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, which operates the NASDAQ.  The Laws That Govern the Securities 
Industry, id.  The 1934 Act also prohibits certain types of conduct in the markets and 
provides the Commission with disciplinary power over regulated entities.  Id. 
 166 Dempsey, supra note 153, at 13-14. 
 167 Id. at 14. 
 168 Id. 
 169 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 140-41 (stating that external constraints on the ex-
ercise of corporate power stabilize power relationships; thus, regulation is not neces-
sarily antithetical to the interests of those being regulated); NASH, supra note 4, at 
275-76 (quoting Yale Brozen, The Untruth of the Obvious, in REPUBLICAN PAPERS 143, 
157 (Rep. Melvin R. Laird ed., 1968) (“The fact is that most of these regulatory agen-
cies have ended up setting price floors to protect industry, not price ceilings to pro-
tect consumers—and regulated industry has tended to become more inefficient a 
result.”)). 
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served to support existing oligopolistic power at the expense of con-
sumers.169  Consequently, claims that conversion of entities, such as 
utility companies and insurance providers, to profit-making machines 
is “good for the economy” and “good for people” are dubious at best, 
as illustrated by a comparison of the Enron case with the Western Re-
sources case.  In Enron, individuals in pursuit of self-interest, left to 
their own devices, sought personal enrichment, glory, and the build-
ing of empires at the expense of consideration of other constituen-
cies.  In the Western Resources case, the ambitious CEO seemed to 
be following the same path, but an objective body, tasked with look-
ing after the public interest, exposed the facts surrounding proposed 
transactions and stopped managerial actions certain to drive that 
company into unmanageable debt, resulting in considerable losses to 
the shareholders. 
Given these contemporary and historical lessons, conservatives 
recklessly abandon their belief in pragmatism when they invoke a 
romanticized vision of “free market America.”  The assumption that 
the laissez-faire system can somehow “heal” itself of its defects without 
any meaningful form of regulation is misguided and unfaithful to his-
tory. Despite its appealing frontier connotations, the concept of a 
“free market” separate from government is simply a myth.  As Dean 
Joseph Tomain observes, markets simply do not exist without gov-
ernments: “Governments create, protect, and enable transactions of 
property in markets.”170  Dean Tomain explains further that govern-
ments work to enable markets by ex ante or ex post regulation.  Ex 
ante regulation occurs prospectively, when government promulgates 
a regulatory scheme to promote economic, equitable, or social 
aims.171  Ex post regulation occurs retrospectively, when “the market” 
operates according to a “baseline of rules designed for the creation, 
transfer, and protection of property,” otherwise known as the com-
mon law.172  Conservatives seem to want it both ways: no promulgation 
                                                          
 170 See Tomain, Networking, supra note 12, at 830. 
 171 Id. at 831 (“To correct dislocations before the fact, ex ante as the economists 
say, government intervention into ‘the market’ is necessary, and such intervention 
modifies or displaces the common law baseline.”). 
 172 Id. at 830; see also Rabin, supra note 114, at 1192 (explaining the distinction be-
tween the “policing model of regulation” and “the weaker model of government in-
tervention based on common law tort and property principles [which was] the preva-
lent form of ‘regulation,’ along with sporadic state and local controls, before the 
Commerce Act”). 
 173 Externalized costs have been defined as: 
a positive or negative impact upon a person not a party to it.  Air and 
water pollution caused by the manufacture of a commodity is an exam-
ple of a negative externality, one resulting from the consumption of 
the environment as if it were a free good, when it is in fact a scarce re-
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of meaningful prospective, ex ante standards, and no lawyers bring-
ing suits as ex post regulation to remedy the externalized costs173 cre-
ated by a failure to regulate beforehand. 
The second force apparently driving conservatives to favor a 
mythical model of unrestrained corporate capitalism is that to com-
pete globally, American corporations must combine in order to con-
trol market share internationally.  This justification clashes strikingly 
with the oft-articulated conservative values of retaining individual 
economic prerogatives and the power of self-determination, not to 
mention preservation of local communities.174  It must be recognized 
that the aim of global domination cannot be achieved without ensur-
ing a sphere of marketplace control that transcends individual corpo-
rations and “requires cooperation, planning, and noncollusive con-
certed action.”175  “Market power, based on control through 
administered prices,” must be shared and mutually protected by 
companies who otherwise would compete, “while the law works to 
stabilize the position of entrenched oligopolists.”176  In the resulting 
oligopoly-dominated market,177 “combination and cooperation render 
                                                                                                                                      
source.  So too are injuries to workers in an unsafe workplace, or inju-
ries to depositors in failed banking institutions. 
Dempsey, supra note 153, at 17-18; cf. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243 (presenting a tale of a “rational herdsman” compet-
ing with other herdsmen to increase the size of his herd without limit, in a world that 
is limited). 
Shareholder primacy assumes the existence of external remedies.  The theory 
“does not imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go un-
protected.  It merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protect-
ing the interests of nonshareholder constituencies—or at least all constituencies 
other than creditors—lie outside of corporate law,” including the areas of labor, pen-
sion, health and safety, warranty, tort, and antitrust law.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 442 (2001). 
 174 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.  It is also at odds with an early con-
servtive theory of laissez-faire, combined with non-intervention in economic affairs of 
other countries, as a foundation for peace.  Raico, supra note 59, at 5. 
 175 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 23. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Market conditions facilitating oligopoly pricing exist in many U.S. industries 
today.  Michal S. Gal, Reducing Rivals’ Prices: Government-Supported Mavericks as New So-
lutions for Oligopoly Pricing, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 73, 75 (2001). 
 178 As stated in George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Laws, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 439, 444 (1982), 
In contrast to a firm in a perfectly competitive market . . . the oligopo-
list does not expect its rivals to behave in [an] aggressive manner.  
Rather, it assumes that rivals will not expand their output at all, and 
under the most favorable assumption, that rivals will follow its move by 
matching its price and similarly reducing output.  This assumption re-
sults from the belief that when the number of rivals is small, each will 
realize that their fortunes are interdependent.  Any one firm’s aggres-
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traditional notions of competition meaningless,”178 and the decisions 
of the marketplace do not hold the same significance for “competi-
tion.”179 
In fact, in order for the United States to dominate the global 
marketplace, “competition,” a basic assumption of laissez-faire ideol-
ogy and a systemic protector of consumers,180 must, and has, given way 
to shared monopoly, characterized by corporate concentration, con-
solidation, and merger.181  In today’s economy, therefore, the Invisi-
ble Hand of the free market is less capable than ever of fulfilling its 
theoretical function as a natural counter-force to greed and self-
interest.182  Instead, the law’s protection of big business against the 
harsh realities of pure competition has allowed greed and self-
interest, along with a lack of accountability, to flourish. 
Policy makers must recognize the contradictions inherent in 
conservative nostalgia for a mythical era of pure laissez-faire versus 
anxiety over America’s international position, and make decisions 
with eyes open.  Conservatives, who value the lessons of history, 
                                                                                                                                      
sive action will, because of its perceptible impact on its rivals’ sales vol-
ume, inevitably be self-defeating; such action induces retaliation that 
ultimately renders all rivals worse off. 
The coordinated conduct of such firms, referred to as conscious parallelism or 
oligopoly pricing, arises simply through independent rational behavior and does not 
amount to illegal collusion.  Gal, supra note 177, at 76.  Professor Gal comments that 
“[d]espite the significance of the oligopoly pricing problem, antitrust does not have 
any efficient tool in its arsenal to combat it directly, without upsetting established no-
tions of market conduct or taxing the administrative system beyond its regulatory 
powers.”  Id. 
 179 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 137. 
 180 As Professor Rabin notes, in the nineteenth century, those lower down the 
commercial chain—including consumers of rail transportation services—were the 
beneficiaries of the “cutthroat” competition among the railroad carriers.  Rabin, su-
pra note 114, at 1198. 
 181 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 169. 
 182 Conservative antitrust policy and conservative judicial support of corporate 
autonomy have helped sustain a permanent “oligopoly of oligarchists” in the Ameri-
can economy.  Id. at 179-80. 
 183 In a poll taken in August 2002, sixty-four percent of citizens polled reported 
that they had neutral or negative feelings about large business corporations.  See      
% Say the Bush Admin Isn’t Paying Enough Attention to Working Families, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL’S HOUSE RACE HOTLINE, Aug. 29, 2002.  “Only 10% of adults surveyed last 
year think corporations can be trusted a great deal to look out for the interests of 
their employees.”  Stephanie Armour, Employees’ New Motto: Trust No One, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 5, 2002, at 1B.  While greed and corruption have characterized American cor-
porations since their beginnings “from Civil War profiteers to inside-trading scandals 
of the ‘80s . . . the new millennium has ushered in a wave of fraud, corporate malfea-
sance, investment scams, ethical lapses and conflicts of interest unprecedented in 
scope.”  Strauss, supra note 16.  “A recent Brookings Institution poll found that pub-
lic support of corporations has waned since fall [2001].”  Id. 
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should examine the past, as well as their ideological contradictions, as 
they formulate their positions in response to today’s corporate crises. 
The Waning Power of Self-Determination 
In the wake of a continuing series of scandalous revelations, 
news sources report that public distrust of corporations is at a record 
high.183  But in fact, distrust of large business corporations is as old as 
the form itself.184  The terms of the modern debate echo those of 
nineteenth century anti-monopolists, who warned of the perils to 
consumers and the public resulting from the accumulation of vast 
corporate wealth and political power.185  Two distinct views emerged.  
Proponents of the first, represented by Theodore Roosevelt, favored 
selective enforcement of antitrust laws, and regarded large corpora-
tions as a positive development in their promotion of the laudable 
goal of efficiency.186  Supporters of the second view, represented by 
Justice Louis Brandeis, adhered to the classical liberal economic out-
look.187  Justice Brandeis described this view of corporations as fol-
lows: 
Although the value of this instrumentality in commerce and in-
dustry was fully recognized, incorporation for business was com-
monly denied long after it had been freely granted for religious, 
educational, and charitable purposes.  It was denied because of 
fear.  Fear of encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities 
of the individual.  Fear of the subjection of labor to capital.  Fear 
of monopoly.  Fear that the absorption of capital by corporations, 
and their perpetual life, might bring evils similar to those which 
attended mortmain.[188]  There was a sense of some insidious 
menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly 
when held by corporations.189 
                                                          
 184 See BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 38-42; Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Foreword to MODERN 
SOCIETY, supra note 118, at x, xi.  According to Demos, a public policy research or-
ganization in New York, over the last century Americans’ trust in major financial and 
Wall Street institutions has fluctuated considerably according to larger changes in 
American politics.  David Callahan, Private Sector, Public Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2002, at A21.  Examples include the Progressive Era backlash against abuses of nine-
teenth century “robber barons” and New Deal Liberalism which grew out of the dis-
trust caused by the Wall Street excesses of the 1920s and the crash of 1929.  Id. 
 185 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 61. 
 186 Rabin, supra note 114, at 1218-19. 
 187 Id. at 1219. 
 188 “Mortmain” is “an inalienable possession of lands or buildings by an ecclesias-
tical or other corporation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1012 (6th ed. 1990). 
 189 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
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With the first wave of corporate mergers in the last two decades 
of the nineteenth century, the debate swelled to new proportions, as 
members of the Populist and Progressive Movements challenged cor-
porations’ funding and control of American politics.190  While pur-
porting not to oppose naturally-arising, “reasonable” combinations, 
these activists believed that pervasive unfair business practices re-
quired regulation in order to preserve competitive capitalism.191  
Manifestations of the trend toward monopolistic practices, including 
the railroad and beef trusts, helped lead to the passage of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.192 
Another concern arose at the turn of the twentieth century with 
the formation of interstate as well as intrastate chain stores.  The 
emergence of such stores prompted some states to discourage them 
by imposing special taxes and licensing and other regulatory fees.193  
A sea change was occurring in business ownership.  Again, Justice 
Brandeis noted: 
Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool em-
ployed by individuals in the conduct of private business have be-
come an institution—an institution which has brought such con-
centration of economic power that so-called private corporations 
are sometimes able to dominate the state.  The typical business 
corporation of [the nineteenth century], owned by a small group 
of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in size by 
their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns in 
which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees 
and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors 
are subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control 
of a few men.194 
Then, as now, untamed corporate growth threatened the exis-
tence and economic well-being of smaller players195—farmers, indus-
                                                          
 190 BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 61. 
 191 Id. at 63. 
 192 See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 219 (1898) (recognizing 
that many “trusts and conspiracies,” including the beef and railroad trusts, motivated 
Congress to pass the Act).  In the Senate debate on the original bill introduced by 
Senator John Sherman, Sherman stated, “If we will not endure a king as a political 
power we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of 
any of the necessaries of life.”  But he clarified that the aim of the bill was not to 
undo economic and social advantages produced by “lawful and useful combination.”  
BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 63. 
 193 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 194 Liggett, 288 U.S. at 565. 
 195 Professor Warren Grimes dubs smaller players “Lilliputians,” defining the class 
to include: 
professionals (such as doctors or lawyers) who practice individually or 
in small groups and must do business with power buyers of their ser-
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trial workers, independent proprietors, and, of course, shareholders, 
including mutual fund contributors.  Then, as now, those favoring 
unregulated corporate expansion argued that the Invisible Hand of 
the free marketplace,196 combined with the individual’s exercise of 
contractual liberty in the private sphere, provides sufficient regula-
tion of markets, jobs, and consumer rights.197 
Chicago School ideology notwithstanding, it cannot credibly be 
contended that the market system has overcome the intrinsic flaws 
that originally required business regulation and now effectively self-
regulates according to theory.  Both history and current events dem-
onstrate otherwise.198  American economic regulation initially grew 
out of a failure of the market to protect consumers and a need to ad-
                                                                                                                                      
vices; small businesses (such as independent pharmacies or book store 
owners) that confront power buyers or sellers; small franchisees that 
have ongoing dealings with a powerful franchisor [sic]; small farmers 
or ranchers that sell their output to power buyers; and any independ-
ent contractor that sells services to a power buyer (such as a taxicab or 
truck owner that sells his services to a large taxicab or trucking firm). 
Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’ 
Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST 195, 196 (2001). 
 196 Dempsey writes that under pure market theory, 
[s]carce resources are distributed by the ‘invisible hands’ of the market 
system to their highest valued use.  Classic economic theory embraces 
the premise that optimum efficiency is achieved when the world’s re-
sources are allocated in a way that maximizes the welfare of consumers, 
as measured by their preferences in the marketplace. 
Dempsey, supra note 153, at 11. 
 197 A recent example occurred last fall, when Congress considered the politically 
charged subject of Medicare benefits.  A proposed bill to add a prescription drug 
benefit to Medicare bogged down because Republicans favored letting the “invisible 
hand of the market” rather than government set prices and premiums.  Vicki 
Kemper, Privatization at Heart of Stalemate in Debate Over Medicare; A GOP Proposal for a 
Market-Driven Program May Scuttle a Deal on a Prescription Benefit, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2003, at A26.  Democrats worried that the cost of medicine would climb too high if 
not forced down by government regulations.  Id. 
 198 George Soros argues that market fundamentalism will be as temporary as the 
pre-1913 victory of markets over social and political institutions: 
Financial markets are inherently unstable and there are social needs 
that cannot be met by giving market forces free rein.  It is market fun-
damentalism that has rendered the global capitalistic system unsound 
and unsustainable.  This is a relatively recent state of affairs.  At the end 
of the Second World War, the international movement of capital was 
restricted and Bretton Woods institutions were set up to facilitate trade 
in the absence of capital movements.  Restrictions were removed only 
gradually, and it was only when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
came to power around 1980 that market fundamentalism became the 
dominant ideology. 
Eisuke, supra note 120.  But cf. BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 168-71 (arguing that 
Reagan-Bush pro-merger policies marked permanent change in American antitrust 
law). 
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dress the social chaos “wrought by the rise of big business.”199  As dis-
cussed above, the government has repeatedly stepped in to correct 
the results of a fundamental misconception of laissez-faire advocates: 
the belief that it is possible and desirable to reduce all human values 
to market values.200  Although a conservative backlash was predictable 
in response to the proliferation of federal agencies in the 1960s and 
1970s,201 today’s conservatives make the same conceptual mistake as 
their forebears regarding the power of the market to police itself. 
Yet the market seems almost to have displaced the very system of 
American democratic government as an object of veneration by po-
litical conservatives.  Conservatives are known for their nationalism 
and patriotism, founded upon a belief in America’s distinctive char-
acter, reverence for its constitutional form of government, and a pre-
occupation with preserving its unique cultural heritage.202  In the 
realm of public discourse, however, proponents of “leave us alone” 
oligopolistic markets have successfully equated allegiance to capital-
ism and deregulation with core American principles, such as personal 
choice and opportunity to shape one’s destiny.  Such a conflation has 
created an atmosphere, paradoxically, in which dissenters to the 
principle of unlimited corporate growth are cast as political subver-
sives.203 
                                                          
 199 Ballam, supra note 157, at 611-12. 
 200 LOUIS L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7-8 (4th ed. 
1976).  As Senator Cummins stated during the debate on the Sherman Act: 
[W]e must do something to preserve the independence of the man as 
distinguished from the power of the corporation; that we must do 
something to perpetuate the individual initiative.  We often go wrong, I 
believe, in assuming that because a great corporation, a vast aggrega-
tion of wealth, can produce a given commodity more cheaply than can 
a smaller concern, therefore it is for the welfare and the interest of the 
people of the country that the commodity shall be produced at a lower 
cost.  I do not accept that article of economic faith.  I think we can 
purchase cheapness at altogether too high a price, if it involves the sur-
render of the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a 
single master mind. 
51 CONG. REC. 12,742 (1914) (statement of Sen. Cummins) (paragraph structure 
omitted). 
 201 As Professor Stephen Dempsey describes: 
[W]hile there were forty-nine federal agencies in 1960, by 1976 there 
were eighty-three agencies.  The number of civil servants employed by 
regulatory agencies grew from 28,000 in 1970, to 81,000 in 1979.  By 
1985, more than 15 million local, state, and federal employees adminis-
tered the regulatory welfare state.  Paul MacAvoy estimated that in 
1965, regulated industries produced 8.5 percent of the gross national 
product; by 1975, that figure was 23.7 percent. 
Dempsey, supra note 153, at 14 (footnotes omitted). 
 202 DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 57, at 29-31. 
 203 Consider the formation of the three-year-old Club for Growth, whose mission is 
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One critical aspect of the laissez-faire model, overlooked or 
downplayed by conservative theorists, is its assumption, drawn from 
the metaphor of the territorial frontier,204 of a guaranteed “exit op-
tion” for each party in a free market transaction.  This “exit” princi-
ple, rooted as far back as ancient Rome,205 presupposes that consumer 
choice is capable of serving as a check on oppressive commercial 
practices.  In analyzing the importance of the frontier, Professor 
James Buchanan states, “The proper economic interpretation of fron-
tier lies in its guarantee of an exit option, the presence of which dra-
matically limits the potential for interpersonal exploitation.”206  While 
conservatives use laissez-faire ideology to support a hands-off ap-
proach to corporate growth and conduct, they disregard the resulting 
imbalance of power between commercial parties and the consequen-
tial subversion of the conservative ideals of personal choice and free-
dom to shape one’s economic destiny. 
This central contradiction is illustrated in the Consumer Side 
case study, described in Part I of this Article, in which a farmer ac-
quired and attempted to sow crops with a “lemon planter” manufac-
tured by international conglomerate Deere & Company.207  The re-
sulting lawsuit, which the farmer and his company lost,208 illustrates 
how arrogant and unresponsive a modern oligarchy can be to its 
smaller customers when it knows—indeed, when it has helped en-
sure—that the smaller party has available, at best, a very limited “exit 
option.” 
                                                                                                                                      
to disparage anyone, including Republicans, who opposes the administration’s pro-
business policies.  See Nicolas Thompson, Attacks on Fiscal Moderates Fuel Battles in 
GOP; Both Parties Decry Group’s Ads as Illegal, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2003, at A3.  The 
group’s leader, David Keating, vows to attack members of either party who are not 
“free market,” even those he terms “Republicans In Name Only” or “RINOs.”  Id.  
One of the group’s tactics has been to equate opposition to tax cuts favoring big 
business with an unpatriotic stance against the war in Iraq.  Id. 
 204 James M. Buchanan, The Soul of Classical Liberalism, 5 INDEP. REV. 111, 117 
(2000). 
 205 As Professor Ralph Raico explains, a free market works best when trade is de-
centralized: 
After the fall of Rome, no empire was ever able to dominate the conti-
nent.  Instead, Europe became a complex mosaic of competing na-
tions, principalities, and city-states.  The various rulers found them-
selves in competition with each other.  If one of them indulged in 
predatory taxation or arbitrary confiscations of property, he might well 
lose his most productive citizens, who could ‘exit,’ together with their 
capital. 
Raico, supra note 59, at 1. 
 206 Buchanan, supra note 204, at 117. 
 207 See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text. 
 208 Limestone Farms, 29 P.3d at 462. 
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The agricultural equipment sector is something of an oligopoly, 
in that only four companies manufacture over ninety percent of all 
agricultural equipment.209  The major companies employ similar pur-
chase documents, routinely disclaiming implied warranties of fitness 
and merchantability and limiting available remedies to repair and re-
placement of defective parts.210  In this way, the manufacturers, with 
their legions of lawyers and sophisticated grasp of the litigation land-
scape—classic “repeat-player” corporations211—are able to determine 
the outcome of a potential lawsuit years before it actually occurs.  Ex-
perience instructs these companies to minimize their legal exposure 
with disclaimers and other limitations designed both to keep them in 
control of the transaction and out of the courtroom.  Such power en-
ables these corporations to dispose of most claims through successful 
summary judgment motions.212  The terms of the transaction are es-
tablished in advance unilaterally,213 and the other party—often, a 
smaller farm company—has at best a limited exit option.  The exit 
leads to another transaction with similar predetermined, unilaterally-
drawn rules. 
For example, in the Limestone Farms case, the farmer who pur-
                                                          
 209 These figures are based on analyses of the following annual reports from 2001: 
Deere & Company, available at http://www.deere.com/en_US/compinfo/reports/ 
annual/?sidenavstate; Case/New Holland, available at http://investors.cnh.com/ 
ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=CNH&script=700; Caterpillar Challenger, available at 
http://www.caterpillar.com/about_cat/investor_information /pdf/YECX0014.pdf; 
and AGCO, available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/ag/reports/ 
agco_2001ar/main.html. 
 210 Cf. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 233, 233-34 (noting consumer sale contracts are long, complex, standard-
ized, preprinted contracts, carrying mandated disclosures which consumers are dis-
couraged from reading, in a marketplace where choice is often unavailable, given the 
industry-wide use of similar boilerplate contract provisions). 
 211 See Galanter, The Haves, supra note 37, at 97-98 (finding that repeat players are 
actors “who are engaged in many similar litigations over time,” such as insurance 
companies and prosecutors, who have low stakes in any one case and the resources to 
pursue their long run interests).  Professor Galanter now divides the players into the 
“uphill cluster,” defined as cases brought by individuals against organizations, and 
the “downhill cluster,” defined as cases typically brought by plaintiff organizations 
against organizational or individual defendants.  Marc Galanter, Contract in Court, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 592-93. 
 212 See Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 
141 (2000) (examining increased use of summary judgment in federal courts be-
tween 1973 and 1999); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposal 
for Procedural Reform in the Core Motion, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1661 (1995) 
(summarizing the filing and granting of summary judgments in federal court from 
1985 through 1993). 
 213 As Professor Galanter documented, among the advantages enjoyed by repeat 
players is the “ability to structure the transaction.”  Galanter, The Haves, supra note 
37, at 125 fig.3. 
  
2004 CONTRADICTIONS OF CONSERVATISM 965 
chased the defective planter could deal only with the dealership, not 
with the corporation.  He asked all the right questions concerning 
the condition of the planter and its warranties.  While the dealership 
salesman told the farmer the planter was new and fully warranted by 
Deere, Deere had in fact disclaimed all meaningful warranties and 
liability, and provided as well that the dealership could not make 
binding representations on behalf of the corporation, a situation the 
average farmer could not be expected to anticipate.   
Consequently, in their suit against Deere & Company and the 
Deere dealership, the farmer and his limited liability company 
(“LLC”) were doomed before they filed their petition in district 
court.  The plaintiffs claimed breach of express214 and implied war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability,215 failure of the essential pur-
pose of the warranty,216 and violations of the state consumer protec-
tion act.217  Realizing the defendants would argue the only proper 
                                                          
 214 An express warranty is created by “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made 
by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-313(a) (1996) (codifying U.C.C. § 2-313(a)).  
Additionally, “[a]ny description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.”  
U.C.C. § 2-313(b) (2002). 
 215 Implied warranties arise by operation of law and not by agreement of the par-
ties, their purpose being to protect a consumer from loss where merchandise fails to 
meet normal commercial standards.  Limestone Farms, supra note 39, at 461.  The UCC 
authorizes a seller expressly to disclaim implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-316 (1996).  However, 
many consumer statutes forbid sellers from disclaiming the implied warranties in 
consumer transactions and void such disclaimers.  See, e.g., id. § 50-639(a)(2), (e). 
 216 Even in a non-consumer case, where a seller provides an express limited repair 
or replace warranty to the exclusion of other remedies, a buyer is not required to al-
low a seller to tinker with a defective product indefinitely.  Mercury Marine v. Clear 
River Constr. Co., 839 So. 2d 508, 524 (Miss. 2003); Wilk Paving, Inc. v. Southworth-
Milton, Inc., 649 A.2d 778, 781 (Vt. 1994).  Therefore, where an apparently fair and 
reasonable contract clause fails of its essential purpose or operates to deprive a party 
of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provi-
sions of U.C.C. § 2-715, which include consequential and incidental damages.  U.C.C. 
§ 2-719, cmt. 1 (2002). 
 217 See Limestone Farms, supra note 39, at 615.  Like many consumer statutes, Kan-
sas’s statute originally was modeled on the Uniform Buyer Protection Act, which 
rendered unlawful any deception or misrepresentation in connection with the sale of 
merchandise to a consumer.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-623 Kan. cmt. (1973).  The origi-
nal Act provided only for public enforcement.  Id.  That statute was replaced in 1973 
with a broader one that covered the sale of services and real estate, and authorized 
private enforcement, including provisions for penalties and attorneys’ fees to a pre-
vailing plaintiff.  Id.  As in other jurisdictions, much of the power of the revised stat-
ute has been stripped away by court interpretation, including imposition of tradi-
tional standing requirements and narrow interpretations of relevant terms, despite a 
legislative mandate to courts to construe the statute liberally in order to promote 
enumerated policies, including protection from unconscionable supplier practices 
and unbargained for warranty disclaimers.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-623 (b), (c) (1983). 
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plaintiff was the non-consumer land lessor whose representative 
signed the purchase order, the farmer asserted that various UCC pro-
visions called for examination of the facts surrounding the transac-
tion in order to discover its true character.218  Further, the farmer 
contended that he acquired the planter as a consumer, since planters 
are not titled, and he took exclusive possession of it with intent to 
purchase.219  The farmer never got that opportunity, however, be-
                                                          
 218 Brief, supra note 40, at 25-33.  The UCC encourages courts to look beyond the 
four corners of sales documents to understand the true intent of the parties involved 
in a transaction.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-202 (1996) (codifying U.C.C. § 2-202) 
(stipulating that written agreements may be explained or supplemented by oral evi-
dence regarding course of dealing or course of performance); Barbara Oil Co. v. 
Kan. Gas Supply Corp., 827 P.2d 24, 35 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Kansas Comment to 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-202).  Reversing the common law, the UCC establishes a pre-
sumption that a writing is not integrated.  Id.  In determining whether a writing is 
integrated, the court considers such factors as whether the writing contains dis-
claimer clauses, the nature and scope of prior negotiations and any alleged extrinsic 
terms, and the sophistication of the parties.  Burge v. Frey, 545 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 
(D. Kan. 1982) (applying Kansas law).  The course of actual performance of an 
agreement is deemed the best indication of what the parties intended the writing to 
mean.  U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2002). 
 219 Brief, supra note 40, at 46-47.  The statute defined “consumer” as “an individ-
ual or sole proprietor who seeks or acquires property or services for personal, family, 
household, business, or agricultural purposes.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(b) (1983 & 
Supp. 2003).  This definition of consumer is intentionally broad and includes farm-
ers.  See id. § 50-624 Kan. cmt. on Subsection (b) (1973); Stair v. Gaylord, 659 P.2d 
178 (Kan. 1983).  “A consumer transaction” is a “sale, lease, assignment or other dis-
position for value of property or services within this state . . . to a consumer.”  KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-624(c).  The Kansas Comment to this “Definitions” section states, 
“the only requirement is that the transaction involve a consumer.”  Id. § 50-624 Kan. 
cmt. on Subsection (c) (1973) (emphasis added).  The farmer argued that the trans-
action was a “disposition for value”: a consumer-farmer was intimately involved in the 
transaction and took immediate, exclusive, and proprietary possession of the planter 
directly from the supplier; he was the primary beneficiary of the transaction; and the 
fact that a third party temporarily supplied the purchase funds did not change the 
true character of the transaction.  Brief, supra note 40, at 46-47.  Therefore, under 
other statutory provisions, horizontal privity was not required.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
639(2)(b) (1983 & Supp. 2003) and 1973 Kansas Comment 3 (eliminating “once and 
for all” horizontal and vertical privity requirements for actions based on consumer 
transactions). 
The case appeared to be a question of first impression for Kansas courts, but 
other jurisdictions had addressed similar situations, a few ruling in favor of the con-
sumer.  See, e.g., Maillet v. ATF-Davidson, 552 N.E.2d 95 (Mass. 1990) (holding in-
jured press operator’s status as employee of buyer and lack of privity with manufac-
turer did not bar claim as consumer); Mermer v. Med. Correspondence Servs., 686 
N.E.2d 296 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that transactions in which attorneys act-
ing for plaintiff purchased medical records were consumer transactions); Rauder-
baugh v. Action Pest Control, 650 P.2d 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (holding irrelevant 
the fact that defendant company made a misleading statement to the Veterans Ad-
ministration rather than to the consumer-plaintiff because plaintiff relied on the 
statement); Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985) (holding plaintiff employee 
had standing as consumer under state consumer law to sue on group insurance pol-
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cause the district court granted the defendants summary judgment 
on all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed.220 
In ruling for the manufacturer and dealership, the courts held 
that the only proper plaintiff was the land lessor, who had loaned the 
farmer the purchase money.  The lessor’s representative had signed 
the form purchase order, and that, for the courts, was dispositive.  
The courts declined to consider the negotiations and discussions be-
tween the dealer and the farmer, holding instead that, as evidenced 
by the purchase order, the farmer never owned the planter.  As such, 
the farmer was not a proper plaintiff, and his acquisition of the new 
planter was irrelevant.221  Similarly, the farm LLC had not been 
formed at the time the farmer acquired the planter, so it was not in 
horizontal privity with the defendants.  The only possible plaintiff, 
the land lessor, suffered no losses as a result of the planter’s defects;222 
therefore, no proper plaintiff existed.  The boilerplate warranty dis-
claimers and the formalist privity requirements together worked to 
nullify all potential claims. 
Holdings in cases like Limestone Farms, involving industries with 
parallel sales practices, undermine capitalist self-regulation by strip-
ping smaller buyers of viable exit options and, consequently, of their 
power to serve as effective countervailing forces to the indifference of 
large seller corporations.  The courts reviewing the farmer’s case had 
a number of options available, consistent with existing law, that would 
have permitted a jury to review his claims.223  Yet, despite the farmer’s 
and dealership’s engaging in a classic buyer-seller negotiation, draw-
ing on regional custom and establishing a unique course of dealing, 
the courts ignored the actual negotiations in favor of a four-corners 
interpretation of the boilerplate document provided by the corporate 
defendant. 
                                                                                                                                      
icy even though employer alone purchased policy). 
 220 Limestone Farms, supra note 39, at 616. 
 221 Id. at 615; cf. supra note 218. 
 222 The farmer leased the land on a cash-rent basis and had managed to pay the 
rent for that season.  See Brief, supra note 40, at 4. 
 223 See text accompanying supra notes 214-17.  The courts could have held, inter 
alia, that the farmer was a sole proprietor consumer when he acquired the planter 
for his prospective farm; that the farmer, as an agent of the farm company, pur-
chased the planter for the benefit of the company, with borrowed funds, consistent 
with local custom; that the purchase orders were ambiguous (they indicated the 
buyer was an individual, not a company), requiring resort to extrinsic evidence; that 
the boilerplate form, not seen by the farmer, was not fully integrated and/or uncon-
scionable and unenforceable.  See Brief, supra note 40, at 24-64. 
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IV. CONSERVATIVES’ USE OF FICTIONS TO OBSCURE ABANDONMENT OF 
TRADITIONAL VALUES 
As discussed above, with their unswerving allegiance to the ideal 
of laissez-faire, conservatives have all but abandoned the core values 
they profess to hold dear.  In the context of corporate law, conserva-
tives have promoted the distorted theories of Efficiency Doctrine and 
Shareholder Primacy,224 concepts entailing just enough falsity and fic-
tion to foster ungovernable oligopolies at the expense of most other 
values, including survival of traditional culture, communities, and 
morality. 
The Conservative Record: Abandonment of Traditional Values 
While standing against regulation of business from the outside, 
conservatives have also opposed measures that would ensure effective 
internal control.  Even in the wake of a series of devastating corporate 
“meltdowns,” as one corporation after the next is revealed to have 
footings in the sand,225 many political conservatives in Washington 
have opposed meaningful corporate governance reform.226  The pri-
                                                          
 224 “Shareholder primacy” represents the idea that the shareholder is preeminent 
in the hierarchy of a corporation’s constituencies.  David Millon, Game Plan or Busi-
ness as Usual?  A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1001, 1001 n.3 (2000). 
 225 A Chicago-based forensic accounting firm found that 330 companies restated 
their financial statements because of “accounting errors” in 2002, an increase of 
twenty-two percent from the year before.  Carrie Johnson, New Accounting Panel Being 
Watched for Reform Clues, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at E1.  Many corrections came af-
ter the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the collapse of Arthur Anderson, 
which had worked for Enron.  Id. 
 226 Although post-Enron, some conservative politicians, such as John McCain (R-
Ariz.), actively supported reform, many continued to advocate wide-open preroga-
tives for big business.  Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Alison Mitchell, GOP Surpasses Bush on 
Corporate Reform; Republican Legislators Call for Tougher Measures Against Wrongdoing, S. 
FLA. SUN-SENT., July 12, 2002, at 1A.  For example, in connection with the proposed 
Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) stated that he hoped to drastically 
scale back proposals for accounting and corporate governance reforms.  Id.  Even the 
sponsors of the bill that ultimately passed expressed reservations about reform ef-
forts.  Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio), the chairman of the House Finan-
cial Services Committee, warned that the Senate was turning into a “feeding frenzy.”  
Id.  President Bush expressed irritation about the continuing focus on corporate irre-
sponsibility, citing the attack on the World Trade Center as more meaningful: “I be-
lieve people have taken a step back and asked, ‘What’s important in life?’” President 
Bush said.  “You know, the bottom line and this corporate American stuff, is that im-
portant?  Or is serving your neighbor, loving your neighbor like you’d like to be 
loved yourself?”  Id.  Bush’s conservative voter base opposes such regulation.  See Mi-
chael Stein, Taking a Political Pulse: The Stock Markets, Economy and President Bush, 
MONTCLAIR TIMES, July 24, 2002. 
The European media was not fooled by the brief, high-profile show of conserva-
tive support for reform.  As Eddie Holt wrote in The Irish Times, “Public opinion in 
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vate sector’s abdication of its responsibility to goals other than the 
narrow profit-making mission—wholeheartedly supported by conser-
vatives inside and outside of the academy—sends a ringing message 
to the rest of society regarding accountability.  Corporate leaders’ de-
cisions to sacrifice private principle and conscience to the altruistic-
sounding objective of “shareholder primacy” correlate directly with 
the current corporate “meltdown” and attendant accounting and 
management scandals, which have wrought far-reaching negative 
consequences on markets and in the lives of individuals.  Over the 
past couple of years, it has been difficult to pick up the daily newspa-
per without seeing yet another account of illegal or unethical con-
duct by corporate executives.  Fraud, conflicts of interest, and self-
dealing are rampant.227 
The promotion of constricted conservative economic theories is 
especially egregious in light of evidence that unregulated corporate 
conduct does not result in the sort of pure efficiency the theories 
claim228 or, in many cases, the degree of shareholder benefit prom-
ised.229  Instead, predictably, “rational self-interest” drives the people 
who comprise the corporation, and, as illustrated by the Enron and 
Western Resources cases, they frequently put their own interests 
ahead of other, loftier goals. 
                                                                                                                                      
the US has already forced Republican politicians to wear grave faces and praise cor-
porate reform even though they were utterly against such ‘interference’ throughout 
their careers.  Indeed, Republican senators have voted in favour of an accountancy 
practices’ reform bill that they opposed just months ago.”  Eddie Holt, We Gotta Take 
‘Im Out, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at 51.  But cf. Benjamin R. Barber, A Failure of De-
mocracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at A19 (stating Sarbanes-Oxley Bill 
only appears to be a reassertion of public over private interests).  In fact, former SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt, appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1993 and again in 
1998, had attempted to push through reform measures that would have stopped ac-
counting firms from selling services to the companies they audited.  Anya Schiffrin, 
SEC Chairman Says He Won’t Complete Term, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 20, 2000 
(noting Levitt sought to ban accounting firms from getting consulting contracts from 
companies they audit and pioneered Regulation FD, which requires companies to 
give the same information to retail investors as investment bank analysts). 
 227 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Handcuffs Make Strange Politics, You Say? But Not in 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C1 (detailing ongoing criminal investigations 
and prosecutions for fraud of executives of Arthur Andersen, Worldcom, Adelphia 
Communications, Imclone Systems, AOL, Computer Associates, Enron, Global Cross-
ing, and Qwest). 
 228 See Steven A. Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. 
REV. 515, 523-24 (2003). 
 229 See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the 
Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 585 n.17 (1997); Jonathan D. 
Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 85, 105. 
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Recent Reforms 
Having looked the other way for years and even after arguing 
against reform,230 Congress and the major stock exchanges in a classic 
exercise in shutting the gate after the pigs have escaped, moved in 
2002 to increase corporate accountability in general and the effec-
tiveness of boards in particular.  The New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) and NASDAQ private listing standards have a different and 
arguably more effective focus than the congressional approach, be-
cause the former concentrate on self-regulation, whereas the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act231 hastily drafted and passed, emphasizes external, 
bureaucratic-based policing measures.232 
 In early and mid-2002, at the request of then-SEC Chairman 
Harvey Pitt,233 the NYSE and NASDAQ proposed changes to their 
                                                          
 230 Both the SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt and a number of conservative 
congressmen opposed increasing corporate oversight and accountability.  “The 
smart-but-inept Pitt,” for example, “called for a kinder, gentler SEC at a time when 
evidence seemed to confirm the complaint of former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt 
that the agency was already a tame, nearly toothless tiger.  Pitt sought a less 
adversarial atmosphere,” holding meetings with former clients who argued against 
reform.  James Jaffe, Pitt and Stalled Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 2003, at C1.  When 
Congress asked him what the SEC needed, he recommended that it make the 
chairmanship a Cabinet position.  Id. 
 231 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 232 See generally R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creat-
ing a Culture of Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829 (2003).  
Professor Arthur P. Brief of Tulane University Business School believes “[t]he private 
efforts are going to have more impact in the long run. . . .  Corporate governance has 
been corrupted in America, and the only way to change that is to reduce the power 
in the C.E.O.’s hands.”  Kurt Eichenwald, Even If Heads Roll, Mistrust Will Live On, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at C1. 
 233 NYSE, Nasdaq Urged to Review Rules, L.A. TIMES, March 20, 2002, at C7.  As of 
March 1, 2003, Pitt, in a lame-duck capacity, was still running the SEC.  “It’s outra-
geous that Harvey Pitt, whose own conflicts of interests and poor judgment led to this 
resignation more than two months ago, remains in charge while the commission 
crafts landmark rules to implement the corporate responsibility law enacted last 
summer,” remarked Rep. Edward J. Market (D-Mass).  Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Crit-
ics Come to a Boil (Again), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at C2.  Professor Lynn Turner, 
former SEC chief accountant, speculates that the Administration kept Pitt to con-
tinue to fulfill the goals of special interests and to minimize the impact of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act.  Tim Reason, Two Weeks in January, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 2003, at 75. 
As has been widely published, before President George W. Bush appointed Harvey 
Pitt SEC Chairman, Pitt worked as a lobbyist for many of the firms later to come un-
der his jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Dana Milbank, SEC Chairman Pitt a Potential Liability to 
Administration; Bush Defends Regulator from Critics, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at A6.  
Before the Enron scandal, Pitt had little interest in enforcement activity.  “I believe 
that the marketplace usually determines what rational people do,” he said in an in-
terview.  Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron, NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 94.  
Pitt’s predecessor, Arthur Levitt, was a relatively activist chairman, passing rules near 
the end of his term that restricted the consulting services accounting firms could of-
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corporate governance listing standards.  On July 6, 2002, the NYSE 
published the recommendations of its Corporate Accountability and 
Listing Standards Committee,234 which focused primarily on insuring 
the independence of directors.  After President Bush signed the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act into law on July 30, 2002, the NYSE revised its stan-
dards, and on August 16, 2002, published its final proposals and for-
warded them to the SEC for approval.235  The SEC approved the Final 
Corporate Governance Standards on November 4, 2003.236  The first 
standard requires director independence and that boards be popu-
lated with a majority of independent directors.237  An “independent 
director” is one the board has determined has no material relation-
ship with the listed company.238  The board’s determination must be 
published in the company’s annual proxy statement.239  Other stan-
dards require corporations hold “executive sessions” for non-
management directors and publish company-specific governance 
guidelines and codes of conduct and ethics.240  In addition, the stan-
dards mandate that CEOs certify that they are unaware of any viola-
tion by their companies of the listing standards.241  The NASDAQ 
proposal, which has not been adopted, is less comprehensive,242 
though it may be revised to track the NYSE standards more closely.243 
 While the private standards emphasize director independence, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 focuses on enhancing disclosure re-
quirements and preempting potential conflicts of interest.  The Act 
creates a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board whose pur-
pose is to establish standards for accounting firms with public client 
companies and audit those companies for compliance.244  Addition-
                                                                                                                                      
fer to their clients and banned the common corporate practice of leaking market-
moving information to stock analysts and big investors.  See INVESTMENT NEWS, June 4, 
2001, at 10. 
 234 NYSE Official Website, Corporate Governance, Historical Reference Material 
on NYSE Listed Company Corporate Governance Standards, at 
http://www.nyse.com/p1021232175378.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 235 Id. 
 236 NYSE Official Website, Corporate Governance, Introduction & Final Corporate 
Governance Listing Standards [hereinafter NYSE], at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. Standard 2. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. Standards 3, 9. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Raising Corporate Governance Standards: A Review of the New NYSE & Nasdaq List-
ing Proposals, WALL ST. LAW., July 2002, at 6. 
 243 NYSE, supra note 236, Standard 12. 
 244 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219 (2002). 
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ally, the Act increases criminal penalties for corporate fraud and in-
stitutes broad corporate governance changes,245 including establishing 
an affirmative duty for attorneys to inform upper management and 
the board of any transgressions.246 
The long-range impact of recent reforms is yet to be deter-
mined, but some commentators have questioned the efficacy of these 
reactive measures.247  Certainly, the negative economic reverberations 
of corporate malfeasance will be felt widely for years to come.  Inno-
cent third parties, including employees and shareholders, suffer irre-
versible economic loss and, on a broader level, states struggle to bal-
ance budgets ravaged by the fallout.248  Thus, these recent remedies 
seem akin to trying to cure cancer with an aspirin—the symptoms 
grew out of a pervasive disease of the culture—but they are salutary 
changes if for no other reason than because they have brought to 
bear the bright light of public scrutiny on what for two decades has 
                                                          
 245 See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002). 
 246 See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
 247 Professor Douglas Branson labeled the Act “unwieldy and underfunded. . . .  It 
just goes all over the place.  You can’t get your arms around it.”  Michael Journee, 
Reform Law Called “Abomination,” IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 16, 2002, at 1.  Professor 
Bernard Wolfman of Harvard called the compromise rule “anything but tough.”  El-
liot Blair Smith, Corporate Reforms May Not Measure Up, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2003, at 
3B.  Another reform of the Act relates to the role of lawyers.  Initially, the rule re-
quired an attorney to report substantial legal violations by client companies and to 
effect a “noisy withdrawal.”  Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8150, Exchange Act Release No. 46,868 
(Nov. 21, 2002), 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 205).  The new version of the rule simply requires a lawyer to “climb the 
ladder” to report within the organization.  Implementation of Standards of Profes-
sional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release 
No. 47,276 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003).  Professor Susan Koniak 
of Boston University considered the change in this requirement a “bad statement 
about the bar and what it stands for.”  Smith, supra. 
On January 22, 2003, the SEC approved additional new rules relating to restric-
tions on auditors of public companies and disclosure of off-balance sheet transac-
tions.  These rules are a “significant softening” of rules proposed in 2002.  Jonathan 
D. Glater, S.E.C. Backs Rules for Auditors, Revised from Original Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2003, at C7; see Labaton, supra note 233, at C2 (“Reports that the staff of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission is watering down corporate governance reforms 
mandated by Congress have many of the agency’s critics steaming.”). 
 248 See, e.g., Deslatte Aaron, State Cuts 870 Jobs, $67 Million in Budget, SPRINGFIELD 
NEWS-LEADER, Jan. 3, 2003; Warren Fiske, Virginia’s Budget Sinks Deeper in Red, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 12, 2002; Kenneth R. Gosselin, Confidence at 9-Year Low; State 
Residents Worried About Budget Woes, Job Losses, War With Iraq, HART. COURANT, Feb. 11, 
2003, at E1; David M. Halbfinger, Analysts Warn of a Shortfall in New Jersey’s Next Budget, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at B5; Jim Tharpe, Revenue Off for 12th Month; State Income 
Falls by $686 Million in Past Budget Year, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 11, 2002, at 1F; David 
Whelan, State Budget Woes Imperil Financial Future of Many Nonprofit Groups, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 8, 2002. 
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amounted to a secretive, clubbish CEO-worshiping cult.249 
So long as control rests in bureaucracies and “untouchable” in-
stitutions, the citizens’ subservience to these large institutions will 
remain.  Conservative policies, which continue to favor large institu-
tions at the expense of citizen constituencies, foster this result. 
The Fiction of Shareholder Primacy 
The Enron debacle and other examples of pervasive corporate 
malfeasance are rooted in a conservative view of corporate law, which 
has dominated for decades, particularly the last twenty years.  Today’s 
issues of managerial accountability actually began a century ago, 
hand in glove with anxiety over the increasing concentration of 
wealth and separation of the ownership of business from the control 
of business.250  The debate intensified with the crowning of a self-
perpetuating class of “new princes” in corporate America who were to 
preside over economic empires funded by other people’s money.251  
The question was to whom management and boards of directors 
owed loyalty, shareholders alone, or shareholders plus other “stake-
holders,” such as corporate employees and other segments of society 
affected by corporate policies and activities.252 
 The debate was heated, and the positions clear.  Adolph Berle 
and Gardner Means argued that managers were trustees for share-
holders and should not spend any corporate assets or engage in ac-
tivities not directly beneficial to shareholders’ financial interests.253  
                                                          
 249 Cf. Eichenwald, supra note 232. 
 250 The phenomenon of separation of ownership from control in the large corpo-
ration was noted at the beginning of the twentieth century by Eduard Bernstein and 
Konrad Schmidt.  Maurice Zeitlin, Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corpora-
tion and the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. SOC. 1080, 1080-81 (1974); see also WALTER 
LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 50-55, 58-59 (1914). 
 251 In 1932, Berle and Means wrote: 
[I]t is therefore evident that we are dealing not only with distinct but 
often opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the 
other—a control which tends to move further and further away from 
ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, 
a management capable of perpetuating its own position.  The concen-
tration of economic power separate from ownership has, in fact, cre-
ated economic empires, and has delivered these empires into the 
hands of new form of absolutism, relegating “owners” to the position of 
those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercise 
their power. 
ADOLPH A. BERLE , JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN SOCIETY AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 124 (1932). 
 252 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 220-21. 
 253 Id. at 221.  Berle wrote that considering corporations are trustees for the entire 
community “admitted them to a far greater power position than I thought they 
  
974 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:921 
Conservative economist Milton Friedman supported this view, de-
fending “unalloyed corporate profit maximization”254 as the corpora-
tion’s only justifiable goal.255  Merrick Dodd countered that with cor-
porate “citizenship”256 came the same sort of social responsibility 
attaching to human citizenship.257  The conservative view came to 
dominate the dialogue and continues to do so.258  In light of the con-
servative victory, Professor David Millon advises that “only criticism 
centered on the internal relationship between shareholders and 
management has had a hope of being taken seriously.  Berle’s vision  
. . . has provided the basic model for thinking about corporations and 
therefore has effectively defined the boundaries within which serious 
debate about corporate law can take place.”259 
Under the dominant model, corporate management and the 
board of directors operate as agents of the absentee “owner,” the 
shareholders.260  As agents of that “single” owner, management serves 
only that owner’s interests and in “ruthless”261 pursuit of that interest, 
                                                                                                                                      
should have.”  Berle, supra note 184, at xii. 
 254 Millon, supra note 252, at 227. 
 255 Friedman, supra note 147.  Friedman argued that corporations had no business 
trying to divine what constitutes “public interest” and that they could serve society 
best by pursuit of private profit.  Id. 
 256 Scott Bowman explains in depth the genesis of the concept of corporate citi-
zenship.  See BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 6-8.  Classical liberalism “first developed as a 
progressive, if not radical, ideology that served to justify the interests and political 
objectives of the rising capitalist class . . . .”  Id. at 6.  Its development revolved 
around “an affirmation and defense of the freedom and rights of the individual 
whether political, religious, or pecuniary.”  Id.  Thus it justified “an economic system 
that was premised on contractual relations between individuals.”  Id.  The premise 
gave rise to an ideological justification of corporate power.  Id. at 8, 72-73.  Pro-
business constituencies used the ideas of Adam Smith, who was critical of the ineffi-
ciencies of corporate enterprise, as their strongest ideological basis.  Id. at 8.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court began to view the business corporation as an individual entity 
suited to the premises of liberalism, and the law gave birth to “the doctrine of corpo-
rate individualism.”  Id. 
 257 See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145, 1148 (1932). 
 258 Fifty years ago, Berle said it differently.  In 1954, in his book The 20th Century 
Capitalist Revolution, he conceded somewhat reluctantly that Professor Dodd had won 
the argument to the extent that “modern directors are not limited to running busi-
ness enterprise for maximum profit, but are in fact and recognized in law as adminis-
trators of a community system.”  Berle, supra note 184, at xii.  Berle later clarified his 
concession by stating that he did not necessarily think this was the “right disposition,” 
but merely recognized “a social and legal situation whose existence can neither be 
denied nor changed.”  Id. 
 259 Millon, supra note 252, at 228-29. 
 260 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. 
L. REV. 971, 972-73 (1992). 
 261 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280 (1999). 
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works toward a single goal,262 to maximize the owner’s wealth.  The 
firm must work to minimize “agency costs,” defined as the risk of 
managers shirking their duties to the absentee shareholders, together 
with the cost to shareholders of monitoring the managers’/agents’ 
performance.263 
Although the principal-agent or “shareholder primacy” theory is 
the dominant model of the firm, counter-theories have continued to 
evolve, including the corporate governance movement,264 the pro-
gressive corporate law movement, 265 and the communitarian theory 
of corporate responsibility.266  Proponents of these models have at-
tempted to steer the dialogue about corporations toward broader 
concerns, including the ramifications of corporate power.267  But, ac-
cording to Professor Millon, most “serious[]” corporate scholars 
strive to disassociate themselves from these movements.268  In support 
                                                          
 262 But see Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical As-
sessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2002) (stating “directors and managers 
pursuing shareholder interests” have incentive to induce team members to make 
“firm specific investments” to save such costs in the future). 
 263 Id. at 1638. 
 264 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977). 
 265 For a series of articles illuminating this prospective, see PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 266 As Professor Millon explains, communitarians believe that by virtue of mem-
bership in a shared community, individuals owe duties independent of those based 
in contract.  David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate 
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1382 (1993). 
 267 See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Cor-
porations, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 121 (2002); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: or, How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1645 (2002); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance 
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 92 (2000). 
 268 See Millon, supra note 252, at 228 (referring to calls for corporate social re-
sponsibility as “hopelessly marginal”).  In his critique of the “team production” the-
ory of corporate law, which argues that the board of directors is a “mediating hier-
arch” among the shareholders and various factors of production, Professor Alan 
Meese writes: 
Because Blair and Stout would discard the norm of shareholder pri-
macy, some may associate their argument with “progressive” calls for 
corporate social responsibility, i.e., the sacrifice by corporations of effi-
ciency and shareholder profits in furtherance of other concerns.  Blair 
and Stout, however, expressly disassociate themselves from the progressive 
movement, and with good reason. . . .  To be sure, the mediating hierarch 
conception of the public corporation may produce results that might 
seem more “fair” and “just” to some than the results produced by a 
shareholder primacy model.  To Blair and Stout, however, this attribute 
is purely incidental.  As they see things, states have adopted the mediat-
ing hierarch conception of the public corporation for hard-headed 
reasons of efficiency. 
Meese, supra note 262, at 1644-45 (emphasis added). 
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of this restricted view of corporate law and accountability, a stream of 
fictions runs through the dialogue about corporations.  Two primary 
fictions steer the discourse.  The central fiction is the law’s well-
settled treatment of the corporation as an individual, a characteriza-
tion that both symbolically diminishes its size and economic power, 
while at the same time provides protections that undermine account-
ability.  The second major fiction, of more recent vintage, is that the 
shareholder primacy theory drives or reflects corporate practice. 
The fiction of a business corporation as a person with rights, 
rather than a state instrumentality, developed gradually in the nine-
teenth century through a series of Supreme Court cases that set the 
stage for the corporation’s ability to amass immense economic and 
political power.269  One of the most significant cases in this line was 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,270 in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote 
that while admittedly a legal fiction, the corporation nevertheless 
possesses characteristics “incidental to its very existence,” the most 
important of which are “immortality, and . . . individuality; properties 
by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as 
the same, and may act as a single individual.”271  Pro-business forces 
seized on the legal fiction of a business corporation as a person with 
constitutional rights to defend corporate monopoly power by imply-
ing that the corporation was just another entrepreneurial “individ-
ual,”272 thereby disassociating the corporation from the politically un-
                                                          
 269 See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61 (1809) 
(holding that while a corporation is not a citizen, its membership can be examined 
for purposes of Art. III federal court jurisdiction); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 
Cranch.) 43 (1815) (striking down Virginia statutes authorizing confiscation of cor-
porate lands, thus distinguishing legislature’s power over private versus public corpo-
rations); Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding un-
constitutional New Hampshire legislature’s amendment to Dartmouth’s charter as an 
unlawful impairment of private contract); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co., 
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546 (1837) (refusing to recognize implied right of exclusivity 
in charter of company, noting that “any ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must 
. . . operate in favor of the public”); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 
(1839) (holding for practical reasons that corporations are not citizens for purposes 
of Privileges and Immunities Clause); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 
129 U.S. 26 (1889) (considering corporations persons for purposes of Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 
U.S. 418 (1890) (holding regulation that did not provide for judicial review of rates 
constituted deprivation of property without due process); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 
U.S. 578 (1898) (holding that petitioner’s liberty of contract had been violated by 
rate decision). 
 270 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. 518. 
 271 Id. at 636. 
 272 Scott Bowman recounts that during an 1837 debate concerning Pennsylvania’s 
power to revoke its charter with the Second Bank of the United States, pro-business 
forces invoked the “Dartmouth College principle” to undermine the pro-revocation 
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popular, monied elite.273 
The second main fiction about corporations is that Berle’s de-
scription of corporate management as accountable agents of the ab-
sentee owners continues to serve in a practical sense as a model for or 
description of actual corporate conduct.  The theory assumes a de-
gree of employee loyalty, even altruism, and commitment to the cor-
porate mission that no longer seems to prevail.274  It fails to account 
for the ascendancy of selfishness and material acquisition as tran-
scendent values—values that both feed and are fostered by modern 
corporate culture.  The model reposes faith in systemic checks and 
balances, including boards and shareholders, that experience has 
proven insufficient to offset the sheer potency of greed and self-
seeking that act as motivators of top management.275 
Modern conservative scholars persist in promoting the model 
without adjusting it to reflect the lessons of experience.  The ten-
dency of modern conservatives to fictionalize when speaking of the 
corporation is epitomized by the “misguided”276 contractarian move-
ment.277  Staunch adherents to the principal-agent theory and to Effi-
ciency Doctrine, contractarians posit that a corporate firm is best un-
derstood not as a freestanding entity with a public presence and 
corresponding obligations, but as a purely private “nexus of con-
tracts,” an “aggregate of various inputs” acting together to produce 
goods and services.278  They stand on the shoulders of economist 
Ronald Coase, who theorized that “a corporation is an umbrella that 
enables private parties to contract with each other more efficiently by 
limiting the costs of the transactions between them.”279  The contrac-
                                                                                                                                      
forces.  BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 49-50.  Bowman quotes Louis Hartz: 
When it identified the corporation and the state with two individuals in 
a relation of business contract, it served to clothe the corporation with 
a kind of personal individuality—a symbolic effect, which . . . nullified 
the distinction between individual and corporate enterprise which was 
at the heart of the anti-charter theory. 
BOWMAN, supra note 60, at 50 (quoting LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND 
DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860, at 250 (1948)). 
 273 Id. at 50 (quoting HARTZ, supra note 272, at 250). 
 274 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of 
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
 275 See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Enron’s Board Quickly Ratified Far-Reaching Management 
Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at C6; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, How Go-Along Boards Jam 
Up Firms, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2002, at 13A. 
 276 Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 621 (2001). 
 277 According to Professor Bainbridge, most law and economics scholars embrace 
the “nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.”  Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 859. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50 WASH. & 
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tarians claim to be realists, asserting a need to explain what is, rather 
than “plunge headfirst into ought.”280  In their “real” world, the law 
assumes, in effect, that the corporation’s primary constituencies, in-
cluding employees, suppliers, and shareholders, bargain with each 
other in purely voluntary exchanges, each coming to the table with 
equal power, motivated by rational self-interest. 
Contractarian theory borrows a central concept from classical 
liberalism by characterizing the internal workings of corporate life 
from an atomistic perspective,281 which reposes trust and belief in the 
power of individuals to steer their economic destinies.  While this 
permits the theorists to indulge a romanticized view of corporate re-
ality, it also drops corporate accountability out of the equation, be-
cause a “corporation” has no existence outside of individuals. 
Recognizing that in many instances voluntary exchanges do not 
actually take place within a corporation, contractarians argue that the 
fiction is nevertheless useful; because self-interest is a uniform moti-
vator in transactions, they imply, the model of Economic Man as a 
self-seeker is reliably predictive.282  Furthermore, in retrospect, it ap-
pears as if the players went through the process of reaching agree-
                                                                                                                                      
LEE L. REV. 1673, 1676 (1993).  The theory has been interpreted to reject the “false” 
notion that corporations are legal entities created by state action; rather, “states do 
little more than register private decisions already made by private parties.”  Id. at 
1676. 
 280 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 862.  Bainbridge writes: “contractarianism offers a 
metaphor in which the separation of ownership and control is not a problem, but 
rather simply a necessary, and arguably unremarkable, attribute of the modern pub-
lic corporation.”  Id. 
The inevitability of corporate growth for the purpose of efficiency was 
recognized long ago: 
 
[S]omething very like the modern corporation is the inevitable prod-
uct of an industrializing society, whether the society follows a capitalist 
or socialist trend of development. . . .  Given the technologically de-
termined need for a large stock of capital, the managerial require-
ments set by the problem of administering the efforts of many men, 
and the area of discretion demanded for the effective conduct of an 
entrepreneurial function, the corporation, or a reasonable facsimile 
thereof, is the only answer. 
Edward S. Mason, Introduction to MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 118, at 1.  However, 
unlike Bainbridge, Mason’s generation of conservative corporate analysts did not 
find the prospect “unremarkable,” but rather recognized the potential perils associ-
ated with power concentrated in these “non-Statist collectivisms.”  Berle, supra note 
184, at xiv. 
 281 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 882.  Despite the acknowledgment that economics 
correctly drives corporate decision-making, contractarians “envision[] a community 
of spirit, bound together by chains of custom, prescription, loyalty, and honor.”  Id. 
 282 Id. at 869. 
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ment and emerged with a “mutually beneficial” binding contract.283  
These are “outcome” rather than “process” contracts, they explain.284  
Outcome contracts consist of unilaterally-dictated terms, accepted by 
the weaker party;285 they can be characterized as “bargains” because 
the law treats them like bargains, though the legal obligation the law 
imposes came about without bargaining.286  These theorists admit the 
contractarian model does not reflect reality, but as one scholar que-
ries, “So what?”287  They rest complacently in what they contend is a 
description of the status quo.288 
Developed in the 1980s, the contractarian movement corre-
sponds in a number of ways to Ronald Reagan’s brand of political 
conservatism and market fundamentalism.  As discussed above, 
Reagan conservatism appealed to the country’s waning sense of tough 
individuality, independence, and self-determination.  Reagan’s eco-
nomic policies were heavily influenced by the Chicago School’s 
foundation principle that private decision-making drives the econ-
omy.  Like Reagan conservatives, contractarians cling to a romanti-
cized view of an atomistic world of individual power, preferring not to 
acknowledge the modern day reality of the exceptions that swallow 
the rule.  Beneath the fictions employed by contractarians lies a harsh 
view of “natural law,” premised on the assumption that certain indi-
viduals are doomed by natural selection to positions of subservi-
ence.289 
                                                          
 283 See id. at 870. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Bainbridge’s explanation is that the weaker party “accept[s] the trade-offs in-
herent in the standard form” agreement.  Id. at 870-71. 
 286 See id. at 869-70.  As Professor Douglas Branson describes this view, contractari-
ans argue “that the only function of corporate law should be to provide an ‘off the 
rack’ standard form contract which approximated the result the parties to an incor-
porated venture would negotiate, absent transaction costs (legal fees, information 
costs, and so on).”  Branson, supra note 276, at 620-21.  Professor Bainbridge offers as 
an example of an outcome contract drawn from his own experience renting a car 
while in a line with “many impatient travellers [sic].”  The agent handed him a “long 
detailed standard form agreement.  Did I bargain over the agreement’s terms?” he 
asks rhetorically.  “Of course not.  Did I even read the agreement?  No, of course not.  
Was the agreement nevertheless a binding contract?”  Perhaps, depending on the 
nature of the unread, unbargained-for clauses, Bainbridge says, but only if they are 
not particularly oppressive; failure to read a contract is not in itself enough to pre-
vent enforcement of the contract.  Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 870.  This raises the 
question: what constitutes oppression in the age of repeat-player corporations and 
conservative courts? 
 287 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 871. 
 288 See id. at 861. 
 289 The conservative principle of the legitimacy of inequality, based on natural law 
principles, is firmly and historically grounded.  See, e.g, MEYER, supra note 35, at 38, 
144; David Hume, Of Justice (1751), from AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 
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Belief in and exploitation of “natural variation” in human abili-
ties shores up the conservatives’ “hard line” on social issues and in-
fuses the contractarians’ description of contractual “reality.”  Behind 
their public affirmation of fair treatment of individuals lies a long-
held conservative subscription to the principle of the “legitimacy of 
inequality.”290  Natural variations in intelligence, ability, and the con-
tent of character inevitably produce classes in society, conservatives 
believe, and there is a natural tendency for elites to rise to the top.291  
Conservatives dislike “equalitarianism” that “would forbid to men the 
acquisition of unequal goods, influence or honor and the right to 
pass these ‘inequalities’ on to their heirs . . . .”292  These deeply-rooted 
conservative views inform the contractarians’ fictional model of the 
“voluntary” transaction. 
Edmund Burke might explain modern conservatives’ use of illu-
sion to obscure the reality of unequal bargaining power and the lack 
of meaningful exits as “veiling.”  Burke might say that contractarians 
are simply and wisely “throwing a veil” over irregularities in order to 
preserve the appearance of continuity.293  He believed veiling permits 
society to rise above the barbarism that would prevail if humankind’s 
true impulses and predilections were exposed.294 
Burke’s veiling metaphor helps illuminate the tension between 
conservatives’ belief in efficiency formulas and vigilant pursuit of self-
interest, on the one hand, and their professed adherence to a more 
civilized code of moral principle, such as treatment of individuals ac-
cording to their worth, on the other.  In order to justify the exploita-
tion inherent in unregulated self-seeking, which can strike harshly in-
side and outside of the hierarchical corporate context, it is essential 
to construct a model that distorts facts, hypothetically placing all ac-
tors on an equal footing.  This same basic conceptual fiction props up 
classical contract, discussed below, which deems that all actors come 
                                                                                                                                      
MORALS, in CONSERVATISM, supra note 4, at 40; W.H. Mallock, A Study of the Rights, the 
Origin, and Social Functions of the Wealthier Class (1898), in CONSERVATISM, supra, at 
220-21; Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), in CONSERVATISM, 
supra, at 95-96; William Graham Sumner, Sociological Fallacies, in CONSERVATISM, supra, 
at 240-4; Joseph A. Schumpter, Aptitude and Social Mobility (1927), in CONSERVATISM, 
supra, at 224-32. 
 290 Muller, supra note 4, at 18. 
 291 See supra note 289. 
 292 MEYER, supra note 35, at 38. 
 293 Muller, supra note 4, at 20-21.  Burke created the concept of “veiling” as against 
the Enlightenment metaphors of transparency and light—the veil as “a fabric of un-
derstandings that hides the true object of the natural passions.”  Id.  The veil of cul-
ture leads men to restrain themselves, while its removal returns man to a “natural” 
barbaric state.  Id. 
 294 See id. at 21. 
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to the table in equal bargaining positions, with equal opportunity to 
make the law that will bind them.  Of course, in today’s world of in-
ternational oligopolies and form contracts, from the smaller players’ 
perspective, at least, that is nonsense. 
Conservatives betray the lessons of history and their asserted be-
lief in prudence and pragmatism when they emphasize self-interest 
and efficiency as the sole guiding principles in thinking about trans-
actional law.295  Experience teaches that the world of commerce is rife 
with inequalities and that to preserve non-economic values, such as 
treatment of others according to worth, accountability for the effects 
of one’s conduct, and maintaining civilized interaction, the law must 
respond. 
Despite the soundness of the assumptions underpinning Coase’s 
theory, today’s large corporate firms do not resemble the efficient 
machines the theories postulate.  People are indeed motivated by self-
interest.  Theoretically, firms do develop as efficient alternatives to 
businesses contracting with multiple independent producers to meet 
their growing requirements.  But in an era of empire-building and 
unregulated mergers and acquisitions, large corporations with their 
“trappings of sovereignty,” aggregated wealth, and other characteris-
tics of private government, often resemble business’s despised neme-
sis, the state.296  Rather than reaping the rewards of vigorous competi-
tion—better products at the lowest possible prices—consumers end 
up subsidizing comfortable oligopolies, and the excessive lifestyles of 
executives, with their bloated expense accounts, Hampton vacations, 
and guaranteed bonuses and golden parachutes.  Corporate theorists 
must confront this reality and do better than writing off these flaws in 
the system as, for example, “excessive agency costs.”297 
                                                          
 295 See generally George Soros, Busted: Why the Markets Can’t Fix Themselves, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 18.  Soros describes his theory of “reflexivity,” according 
to which misconceptions are partly responsible for most economic boom/bust se-
quences and identifies two specific elements that account for “what went wrong” in 
the 1990s: “a decline in professional standards and a dramatic rise in conflicts of in-
terest.”  Id.  He asserts that both are “symptoms of the same broader problem: the 
glorification of financial gain irrespective of how it is achieved.”  Id. 
 296 See Brewster, supra note 118; see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Con-
tracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 414 (1989); Richard 
Saliterman, Perceptions Bearing on the Public Policy Dynamics of Corporate Law, 20 
HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 265 (1996) (quoting Mark Green, Attainment of Social Goals Re-
quires Corporate Reform, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: 
THE ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978, at 265, 268 (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979)); 
Wolfe, supra note 279, at 1684. 
 297 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Johnsen, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: 
Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 920 (1985); Eric W. Orts, Shirking 
and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 315 (1998); Geof-
frey S. Rehnert, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency 
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Fictions in Contract Law 
Corporate law scholars are not alone in their preference for fic-
tion over reality.  Academicians in the area of contract, though lag-
ging behind by a few years, have followed suit.  Scholars are now pro-
ducing accounts of the “new conceptualism,” “neoformalism,” the 
“new formalism,” and “anti-antiformalism” in contract.298  The new 
conservatives in contract apparently consider the realist revolution a 
“flop.”299  They seek “to discredit and displace Llewellyn’s claim to 
found commercial law in immanent commercial practice.”300  These 
descriptions of the current trend in contract law, away from the flexi-
ble approach embodied in the UCC and toward a return to interpre-
tation of contracts under rigid, formal requirements, help explain 
what happened in the farmer’s case.301 
Prominent among scholars who lately question Llewellyn’s 
premise is Professor Lisa Bernstein, whose interesting empirical study 
of private merchant courts has led her to conclude that custom, more 
specifically “usages of trade” and “commercial standards” as the terms 
occur in the UCC, may not exist, and, if they do not exist, they cannot 
be ascertained.302  Other scholars question courts’ ability to create 
                                                                                                                                      
Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1155-60 (1985). 
 298 See generally David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 
(1999); Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New 
Formalism (With Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13 
(2001); Robert A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” In Contract Law and the Process of 
Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879 (1999); James Mooney, The New Conceptialism in Con-
tract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995); Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of 
Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1529 (2002); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and 
the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869 (2002); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of 
Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000); 
Robert E. Scott, A Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. L. REV. 847 (2000); 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1223 (1999); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 971. 
 299 See Charny, supra note 298, at 846. 
 300 Id. at 842.  Professor Charny explains: “The central counterclaim is anti-
incorporationist; even demonstrably efficient customs should not be legally enforce-
able; parties may wish to have customs, or even express undertakings, enforced by 
nonlegal sanctions, but not by the force of law.  Further, custom may often be ineffi-
cient and for that reason not a plausible candidate for legal enforcement.”  Id. at 842-
43 (footnotes omitted). 
 301 See supra notes 207-23 and accompanying text. 
 302 Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: 
A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715 (1999); see also Lisa Bernstein, Mer-
chant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (concluding that the UCC’s search for immanent 
business norms creates undesirable effects in commercial relationships and is flawed 
because it mistakenly assumes transactors’ actions are the best indication of what 
they intended their writing to mean). 
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useful default rules ex ante and adjust risks ex post.303  These critics of 
realism in contract interpretation and enforcement argue for a re-
turn to the “rigorous application”304 of common-law plain meaning 
and parol evidence rules.  Arguably, the formalist approach squares 
with conservatives’ allegiance to Efficiency Doctrine.305 
Like their counterparts in corporate law scholarship, adherents 
to neo-formalism in contract make clear that issues of fairness, moral-
ity, even ethics, have no place in their restored faith in form over sub-
stance.  In The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, Professor F.H. Buck-
ley writes dismissively, “The naïve law teacher sometimes says, 
objecting to positive theories of law and economics, ‘But I see it from 
a moral point of view.’  In doing so, he reveals his ignorance of moral 
as well as economic theory.”306  Professor Buckley fails to explain in 
what ways those who disagree with him are ignorant of moral theory, 
but one has only to turn to the history of conservative thought for an 
articulation of basic principles of morality.  Beyond that, empirical 
evidence tells us what we need to know: The suffusion of conservative 
economic theory into politics, government, and corporate law has 
had negative results, from both an economic and moral point of view. 
Though scholars take pains to distinguish the “new formalism” 
from the old, this road is well traveled, and the views have not 
changed.  As Professor Charny observes, while formalism has theo-
retical appeal, “there are distinctive difficulties with its transfer to the 
realm of contract and commercial practice.  It is simply not clear that 
there is any ‘gain’ from the move to a more formalizable set of 
rules.”307  Such a regressive move would place all but the most sophis-
ticated or wealthy transactors at a disadvantage, as courts, as in the 
                                                          
 303 See Scott, supra note 298, at 848. 
 304 Id. 
 305 But see Charny, supra note 298, at 850. 
The relevant considerations are perhaps best understood in terms of 
the general economics of formalism in the face of diversity.  Crisp for-
mal rules save the courts the task of deciphering a reasonable expecta-
tion in particular circumstances—a task that becomes more costly as 
understandings become more diverse.  But this invokes an instrumen-
tal dialectic whose indeterminancy [sic] is now familiar.  Although a set 
of simple formal rules saves on the costs of administering the legal sys-
tem, it may do so at the risk of drastically increasing the costs of trans-
acting, by requiring the anticipation of numerous improbable contin-
gencies or forcing parties to avoid altogether transactions that might 
culminate in punitive forfeitures as a result of mere small understand-
ings. 
Id. 
 306 F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 
(F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). 
 307 Charny, supra note 298, at 850. 
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farmer’s case, uphold contract terms unilaterally drafted by the party 
in a superior position of knowledge and expertise. 
Even assuming some courts are not competent to sort out com-
plex evidence of trade custom and usage, the answer is not to ignore 
facts in favor of the language of boilerplate writings, the terms of 
which are dictated by private bureaucrats.  Contract formalists, like 
corporate law contractarians, want to focus on outcome: Do we have 
the appearance of an agreement?  Do we have the trappings of a con-
tract?  Is it possible for us to hypothesize, in retrospect, based on the 
last step of the journey, that the path taken was near enough to what 
the law used to require?  Well, of course.  But to people engaged in 
real world transactions, who live the customs of a region or a trade, 
the journey to contract consummation is everything—it is the bargain.  
The more sophisticated the traders, the more likely they will ensure 
their understandings are fully memorialized.  But there are many 
smaller transactions today, such as the farmer’s, that take place on 
the basis of good faith, without the involvement of lawyers, and de-
spite the “old fashioned” nature of the transaction, smaller parties are 
not able to protect their interests against the repeat players who have 
preempted all viable exit options. 
Admittedly, the fact-finding system is far from ideal, and in to-
day’s economic climate it is stretched to the limit.  The farmer’s case 
illustrates the weaknesses of courts’ recitation of “canned” facts that 
only superficially resemble what actually occurred.  Reasonable ar-
guments can and have been made that the parties doing business are 
in a better position and more adept at protecting themselves than a 
judge at a later date.  Eric Posner posits that parties are in a position 
to both predict judicial error, even incompetency, and design their 
contracts accordingly, and deter opportunistic behavior in contract 
formation.308  But as applied to many commercial contexts, this argu-
ment swallows its tail by assuming away the very issue at stake; it as-
sumes meaningful choice on behalf of each contracting party.  Free-
dom in transactions must mean more than the decision of whether to 
enter into a transaction or walk away.  Meaningful choice also impli-
cates the absence of external pressures on the parties to enter a par-
ticular transaction, for these pressures certainly diminish one’s “posi-
tive freedom.”309  A monopoly industry is an example of an external 
                                                          
 308 Posner, supra note 154, at 752, 758. 
 309 A full discussion of the concept of freedom is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
but it has been variously defined as the absence of interference in one’s activities by 
other human beings (negative liberty); the ability to exercise opportunity, involving 
assumptions of a minimal level of education and understanding (positive freedom); 
and the absence of external impediments on motion.  See Isiah Berlin, Two Concepts of 
  
2004 CONTRADICTIONS OF CONSERVATISM 985 
pressure that limits freedom of consumer choice by resulting in less 
output, less variety, and higher prices.  Cooperative oligopolies with 
parallel pricing could have similar effects.  Adhesion contracts are 
another example of an external pressure imposed on a transaction 
that limits choice.  A relative deficit in knowledge, expertise, or re-
sources is yet another external factor that reduces freedom. 
V. COUNTERVAILING FORCES AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Like societies before us, we will be ill-advised to rely exclusively on 
the conscience or benevolence of the wielders of power to secure 
that it be exercised for ends we value. 
 Abram Chayes, “The Modern Corporation 
and the Rule of Law” in The Corporation In 
Modern Society310 
To the extent it admits of a problem311 with either accountability 
or legitimacy,312 corporate law’s answer has been the board of direc-
tors, whose theoretical function is to oversee and monitor manage-
ment.  Ordinarily, directors possess authority to select and fire man-
agers, review major corporate decisions, hold management 
accountable for operating results, and ensure management avoids 
self-dealing.313  The early directors were “mushrooms,” bored board 
members who quietly existed in the dark:314 “Boards of directors were 
crony ridden, cozy, clubby organizations in which dissent of any kind 
                                                                                                                                      
Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969); Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Con-
tract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 268 (1999). 
 310 Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in MODERN SOCIETY, 
supra note 118, at 25, 45. 
 311 Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 
1292 (1982)  (arguing that corporate governance reform advocates misunderstand 
the economics of the “corporate form of firm organization” and thus misperceive 
that a problem exists). 
 312 To paraphrase Edward Mason, the management of a huge amount of eco-
nomic activity is in the hands of a few thousand men—who selected these men to ex-
ercise this vast authority and to whom are they responsible?  They selected them-
selves—that is the legitimacy problem.  Mason, supra note 280, at 5.  Professor Berle 
wrote: 
Whenever there is a question of power, there is a question of legiti-
macy.  As things stand now, these instrumentalities of tremendous 
power have the slenderest claim of legitimacy . . . .  They must find 
some claim of legitimacy, which also means finding a field of responsi-
bility and a field of accountability.  Legitimacy, responsibility and ac-
countability are essential to any power system if it is to endure. 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., ECONOMIC POWER AND FREE SOCIETY 16 (1958). 
 313 Fischel, supra note 311, at 1281. 
 314 “Mushroom directors are kept in the dark.  If they begin to grow in the job, 
corporations pile a lot of manure on top of them.  Finally, if mushroom directors 
mature in the position, they are ‘canned.’”  Branson, supra note 276, at 613. 
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seldom surfaced.”315 
The social reform efforts of the 1970s engendered the corporate 
governance movement, whose goal was to address the failure of cor-
porations to meet their responsibilities to shareholders and the pub-
lic.316  Like Congress’s recent reactive measures, the earlier movement 
proposed to replace “insiders”317 with independent directors.  The 
obvious benefits of judgments free of conflicts of interests have been 
weighed against the potential costs, which include the possibility of 
an outsider’s lack of expertise and a corresponding clumsiness that 
might render decision-making less efficient.318  The movement had 
some successes; independent boards became common in large cor-
porations319 and ousted poorly-performing CEOs at IBM, General Mo-
tors, Mattel, United Airlines, and a number of other corporations.320 
But installation of outside directors did not cure the weaknesses 
in the director system.  Management could undermine the board’s 
oversight function by denying the directors access to critical informa-
tion, a point demonstrated sensationally when Arthur Goldberg, for-
mer Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and former U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, resigned from the boards of eight 
major corporations, complaining of lack of management support.321  
An equally significant weakness of the independent director concept 
has been a variation of the “Man in the Gray Flannel Suit” syndrome, 
whereby directors initially viewed as independent eventually sign on 
                                                          
 315 Id. at 608. 
 316 Fischel, supra note 311, at 1259. 
 317 Professor Branson describes the characteristics of a classic “insider” board: 
The president of a 1930s publicly held corporation (the title “chief ex-
ecutive” was not in vogue then) would pack the board with corporate 
officer subservient to him (needless to say, no women occupied the 
post).  The executive vice president, one or more additional vice presi-
dents, the presidents of principal subsidiaries, and the corporate treas-
urer (today’s CFO) all might be on the typical board.  The president 
might also appoint his brother-in-law, the outside corporate counsel 
from one of the headquarter city’s largest law firms, the regular in-
vestment banker, and perhaps the CEO of another corporation with 
large cross holdings in his own corporation, a ‘white squire’ in today’s 
parlance. 
Branson, supra note 276, at 607-08. 
 318 Fischel, supra note 311, at 1282-83.  Fischel concludes: “A convincing empirical 
case cannot be made, therefore, that a board composed of a majority of independent 
directors will increase shareholders’ welfare, and no empirical evidence exists to 
support this view.”  Id. at 1283. 
 319 Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798 
(2001). 
 320 Branson, supra note 276, at 627. 
 321 Id. at 613. 
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uncritically to the corporate mission.322  Economic Man lives in the 
boardroom, it turns out, and directors are often compensated hand-
somely,323 eventuating in conflicts of interest. 
As recent events demonstrate,324 despite earlier reform efforts, 
corporate boards have frequently been ineffective as checks on cor-
porate mismanagement and abuses.325  Studies demonstrate that invi-
tations to join boards are based on perceived compatibility and fit.326  
Teamwork and avoidance of conflict are valued,327 as demonstrated in 
both the Enron and Western Resources cases. 
Although what transpires in board meetings is ordinarily secret, 
a great deal of information about the action and inaction of Enron’s 
board of directors has become public.328  The record reveals a board 
that, in every critical way, failed to do its job.  For example, in two 
separate meetings, held in June and October 1999, the board voted 
to waive the company’s code of ethics to permit the company’s CFO, 
Andrew Fastow, to form investment partnerships.329  In October 2000, 
the board’s finance committee voted to begin reviewing the partner-
ships’ transactions as well as Fastow’s compensation, but never fol-
lowed through.330  In February 2002, the board’s audit committee as-
sured Arthur Andersen that it would approve Enron’s financial 
                                                          
 322 The syndrome is based on Sloan Wilson’s novel The Man in the Gray Flannel 
Suit, which portrays the struggle of a middle manager to choose between his com-
pany and his family, amidst pressures to make the corporation’s profit-making mis-
sion his own.  SLOAN WILSON, THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT (1955). 
 323 CEO Pay Rises in Most Industries, Outside Director Pay Also Up in All Industries, 
WORKSPAN, Feb. 1, 2004, at 11 (stating that in 2003, median total compensation for 
outside directors in manufacturing sector was $69,620). 
 324 Corporate scandals continue to emerge.  They are well-documented by many 
easily accessible print and electronic sources.  For example, the New York Times re-
ported recently on five major corporations and their executives currently facing fed-
eral criminal charges, including obstruction of justice, securities fraud, bank and 
wire fraud, and insider trading.  Stephen Labaton, Handcuffs Make Strange Politics, You 
Say?  But Not in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C1.  The companies included 
Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications, and Imclone Systems.  Id.  
In the same paper, it was reported that Tyco International ousted its new CFO for 
“arcane and opaque financial maneuvers.”  Andrew Ross Sorkin, New Tyco Interna-
tional Head Ousts Chief Financial Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C2.  A compre-
hensive website tracking the scandals is MSNBC, A Guide To Corporate Scandals, at 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/wld/business/brill/CorporateScandal_DW.asp (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2004). 
 325 See, e.g., Abelson, supra note 275 (detailing board’s repeated waivers of com-
pany’s code of ethics and failure to follow through on monitoring obligations); Son-
nenfeld, supra note 275. 
 326 Langevoort, supra note 319, at 797. 
 327 Id. 
 328 Abelson, supra note 275. 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. 
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statements.331  The committee, however, failed to ask Andersen ques-
tions about the underlying data of the reports.332  Though financially 
sophisticated and drawing substantial salaries, board members missed 
opportunities to question transactions that even a novice would rec-
ognize as dubious. 
Though in the Western Resources case, the details of key board 
meetings have not been published, one board member resigned, and 
her resignation letter was later made public.333  In the letter, she 
stated she was not given information necessary to act effectively and, 
based on what she did know, thought the corporate actions directed 
by CEO Wittig were ill-advised and counter to the company’s best in-
terests.334  Almost two years later, after the CEO was indicted for fraud 
in a personal transaction,335 the board accepted his resignation.336  
Wittig was convicted of bank fraud and money laundering, sentenced 
to four years, four months, and fined $1 million.337  Another federal 
indictment followed, charging Wittig and another Westar executive 
with forty counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, and other charges, alleg-
ing that the two men sought to “systematically loot Westar of money 
and assets.”338  With one exception,339 members of the Westar board 
stood by passively throughout the events leading to the criminal 
charges. 
In addition to recent changes mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley and 
the private listing standards, some companies have installed “corpo-
rate watchdogs,” in the form of independent lead directors, with vary-
ing results.340  For example, following an accounting scandal, Waste 
Management revamped its board, giving shareholder activist Ralph 
Whitworth lead director duties.341  But other companies experiment-
ing with this move have had more negative results.  In the case of 
Tyco International, Ltd., an independent lead director failed to avert 
                                                          
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Jim McLean, Westar Management, Salaries Denounced; Board Member’s Resignation 
Letter Ordered Released By KCC, TOPEKA CAP.-J., June 29, 2002, at A1. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Rebecca Smith, Westar Chief Indicted Over Alleged Bank Fraud, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 
2002, at C10. 
 336 Dion Lefler, Wittig Leaves Westar, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 23, 2002, at 1A. 
 337 Carrie Johnson, Former Westar Chief Sentenced to 4 Years; Wittig Still Must Face More 
Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2004, at E2. 
 338 Robert Frank, Indictment Alleges Westar’s Former CEO Sought to Loot Firm, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 5, 2003, at C1. 
 339 See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
 340 Mary Williams Walsh & David Leonhardt, To Rein In Abuses, Executives Get 
Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2002, at C1. 
 341 Id. at C5. 
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the company’s fall and is being sued himself for breach of fiduciary 
duty.342 
The dismal state of affairs leading to recent corporate reforms 
was not only predictable, but inevitable.  Conservatives, who populate 
many organizations with close ties to business, pragmatically recog-
nize the uncontrollable nature of greed,343 yet advise that a shared be-
lief in a higher power and a fear of punishment in “the next life” 
have the best chance of resulting in a “virtuous citizenry.”344  They 
prefer to leave morality “to private virtues” rather than state-
controlled corporate governance.345  Had some of these outspoken 
advocates of laissez-faire and efficiency integrated their personal 
moral standards with their public policy stances, they would have ap-
proved increased transparency and accountability well before the 
corporations “got caught” and the politicians were forced to engage 
in a frantic scramble to dam the raging river of two decades of run-
away self-dealing.  It remains a mystery why conservatives, who under-
stand and respect the power of self-interest, who see virtue in tem-
perance and in enforcement of moral standards, who could exert 
substantial positive influence over business conduct, decline to inte-
grate their non-political and political philosophies, in the name of a 
romanticized notion of “freedom.” 
Countervailing Forces 
 With corporate boards often tied too closely to management, 
critics have looked outside the corporation for possible countervail-
ing forces.  Half a century ago, Harvard economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith recognized the growing potential of oligopolies to control 
markets through conscious parallelism and to reap monopoly prof-
its.346  He theorized that new, non-governmental forces would rise up 
to check corporate power and would be as effective as the old same 
side controls—owners, or in the modern context, shareholders and 
boards.347  The new “countervailing power” would come from the 
other side of the market and include organized labor, as well as re-
                                                          
 342 Id. 
 343 See KEKES, supra note 138, at 42-43; Muller, supra note 4, at 10. 
 344 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 892. 
 345 Id. at 891-92.  Professor Bainbridge emphasizes the power of religious and 
secular “virtuous communities” to influence the conduct of “a citizenry regulating 
itself from within.”  Id. at 892, 893.  He fails to analyze how the reality of splintered 
communities, resulting in part from unregulated corporate growth, see supra note 
115, affects his theory. 
 346 Branson, supra note 276, at 608. 
 347 Id. at 609. 
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tailers, which were “required by their situation to develop countervail-
ing power on the consumer’s behalf.”348  Galbraith later acknowl-
edged that neither labor unions nor retailers act on the consumer’s 
behalf, recognizing that union leaders align themselves with corpo-
rate power, and retailers often act purely out of self-interest, gouging 
consumers.349 
Later, Galbraith suggested there existed an unrecognized coun-
tervailing force in the very heart of the corporation itself.350  This 
“technostructure,” consisting of middle and high-level managers, as 
well as professionals such as engineers and scientists, participates in 
the group decision-making of the corporation.351  Because they share 
the values of the rest of society, Galbraith theorized, their influence 
would keep large corporations “on track,” serving broad social pur-
poses.352 
Ultimately, Galbraith failed to identify an effective non-
governmental countervailing force to corporate economic power.  
One explanation is that Economic Man prevails; that ultimately, the 
desire for personal economic security trumps benevolent motivations.  
Individuals with identifiable conflicts of interest, including employees 
at all levels with an interest in job security, are least likely to be effec-
tive counter-forces to the large institutions employing them, regard-
less of their personal beliefs about the institutions’ conduct. 
The Private Attorney General as a Countervailing Force 
Another potential countervailing force to corporate overreach-
ing exists in the institution of the private attorney general, whereby 
private individuals and groups initiate litigation to vindicate the pub-
lic interest.353  The label “private attorney general” has a broader 
meaning now than when Judge Jerome Frank coined it in 1943,354 and 
a more negative connotation.  Judge Frank labeled a phenomenon 
that the United States Supreme Court had already recognized—that 
Congress could constitutionally create a justiciable controversy by au-
                                                          
 348 GALBRAITH, supra note 5, at 115, 117. 
 349 Branson, supra note 276, at 609-10. 
 350 Id. at 610. 
 351 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 71-72 (1967). 
 352 Id. at 289-90. 
 353 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281 (1976) (exploring the impact of increasing regulation of social and 
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of plaintiffs, standing requirements, and available remedies). 
 354 Associated Indus. of N.Y., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as 
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
  
2004 CONTRADICTIONS OF CONSERVATISM 991 
thorizing private parties to enforce public rights, without necessarily 
creating a new substantive private right.355 
When Professor Abram Chayes described this phenomenon in 
his seminal 1982 article,356 private attorneys general included indi-
viduals, such as the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education357 or Flast v. 
Cohen,358 as well as professional public interest groups like the Sierra 
Club and Common Cause, which brought suit on behalf of a mem-
bership sharing a common interest in monitoring the administration 
of public programs.  Unlike the classic “Hohlfeldian” plaintiff,359 who 
litigates private claims based on common-law rights, the ideological 
plaintiff seeks to enforce rights common to the public at large.360  The 
traditional plaintiff sought to enforce private contract rights,361 
                                                          
 355 In deciding whether Associated Industries of New York had standing to sue the 
Secretary of the Interior over the department’s order to increase minimum prices for 
coal, the Second Circuit reviewed two U.S. Supreme Court precedents in which the 
Court had held that a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of a statutory provision 
did not require that plaintiffs have traditional standing, but that the litigants have 
standing to act as representatives of the public interest.  Id. at 702-03 (citing Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Fed. 
Communications Comm’n v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)).  The Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that a statute creating the right to sue on behalf of the public 
interest did not necessarily create new private rights.  Ickes, 134 F.2d at 703-04.  “Such 
persons, so authorized,” the court wrote, “are, so to speak, private Attorney Gener-
als.”  Id. at 704. 
 356 Abraham Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
4-5 (1982). 
 357 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
 358 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 359 In the classical litigation model, 
[t]he dispute is between private parties, and it concerns the conse-
quences of the parties’ actions for the legal relationships—rights and 
obligations—between them.  This central focus on the dispute more or 
less determines the other basic elements of the traditional model.  
First, litigation is bipolar: two parties are locked in a confrontational, 
winner-take-all controversy.  Second, the process is retrospective, di-
rected to determining the legal consequences of a closed set of past 
events.  Third, right and remedy are linked in a close, mutually defin-
ing logical relationship.  Fourth, the lawsuit is a self-contained entity.  It 
is bounded in time: judicial involvement ends with the determination 
of the disputed issues.  It is bounded in effect: the impact is limited to 
the (two) parties before the court.  Finally, the whole process is party 
initiated and party controlled.  The judge is passive, a neutral umpire. 
Chayes, supra note 356, at 4-5.  See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Pub-
lic Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
 360 See generally Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). 
 361 Chayes, supra note 356, at 5 (“Lon Fuller, in his Forms and Limits of Adjudica-
tion, posits that the typical classical-model litigation is a suit between businessmen for 
breach of contract.  The chief function of adjudication is the settlement of contract 
disputes.”) (footnote omitted). 
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whereas the non-Hohlfeldian plaintiff came to court to challenge, for 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s failure properly to 
enforce the Clean Water Act. 
In the heyday of the private attorney general, the United States 
Supreme Court relaxed requirements for standing and recognized 
legal interests “beyond the traditional common law protections of 
person and property.”362  The Court was responding not only to a re-
vision of the classic litigation model, but to a change in the very na-
ture of law and the role of government.363  As the “second wave” of 
regulatory reform swept the nation,364 citizens desired to hold ac-
countable a government whose activities went far beyond traditional 
Lockean concepts.365  The Supreme Court’s standing decisions in this 
era effectively sanctioned “citizen suits” as countervailing forces to 
both government and private power.366  
Private enforcement of public law spread to the commercial con-
text when, in the late 1960s, the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Council of State Governments initiated a joint effort to encourage 
the enactment of state statutes to supplement the Federal Trade 
Commission Act’s (“FTCA”)367 prohibition of unfair and deceptive 
trade practices.368  These organizations created three alternative ver-
sions of a model law,369 and by 1981, every state had enacted it in some 
form.370  In addition to substantive provisions similar to the FTCA, the 
great majority of states authorized suits by private attorneys general.371  
State attorneys general shared authority with individual consumers to 
file claims against companies that engaged in deceptive or uncon-
scionable trade practices.  These statutes did more than provide 
mechanisms for balanced enforcement of private contractual and 
warranty rights; they recognized, often explicitly, that citizens could 
act as effective vindicators of the public interest.  Under these statu-
tory schemes, successful plaintiffs could, and in some cases, still can, 
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 365 Chayes, supra note 356, at 10. 
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obtain not only their actual damages, but also statutory penalties, pu-
nitive damages and/or treble damages, and attorney fees.372 
Enthusiastic federal acceptance of the private attorney general 
was short-lived, as the conservative Burger Court resuscitated old 
standing requirements and related concepts from the classical model 
of private rights litigation and imposed them on the new reality of an 
administrative state.373  The Court has continued to retreat from ear-
lier, more fluid interpretations of standing in an effort to narrow the 
expanded role of the judiciary in public lawsuits and to return judges 
to their classical function of deciding discrete disputes between pri-
vate litigants, retrospective in nature, reaching to the future only by 
means of case-by-case precedent.  The Court accomplished this by 
clarifying that standing to sue requires plaintiffs to allege a particular-
ized interest, distinct from that held by the public in general.374  Addi-
tionally, the Court imported into public law litigation standing analy-
sis a tripartite causation requirement developed in the context of the 
traditional private lawsuit.375 
By the 1980s, as the conservative movement came to dominate 
politics and judicial appointments, the private attorney general had 
taken on a different cast.  While initially the term denoted an indi-
vidual or non-profit organization seeking to enforce the public inter-
est, the rise of the large class action lawsuit both broadened the term 
and stripped it of its original associations.  Because of the prohibitive 
cost and difficulty of pursuing plaintiffs’ claims alone, attorneys be-
gan to hold back, watching and waiting until a public agency filed an 
action, then joining in to claim their portion of a lucrative class ac-
                                                          
 372 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17082 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 42-110g(a) (West 2004) (allowing court discretion); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,               
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§ 17.50(d). 
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tion settlement.376  Private attorneys general became known as “free 
riders,”377 and “bounty hunters.”378 
Recognizing that ideological plaintiffs still brought suits, scholars 
of the time identified two types of private attorneys general, attaching 
various labels to the dichotomy, such as “mercenary law enforcers” 
versus “social advocates.”379  In reality, in the wake of the increased so-
cial consciousness and statutory reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, 
there were many reasons why plaintiffs and their lawyers sought to ad-
judicate rights and interests held in common with others.380  At the 
very least, many of these lawyers represented a new type of plaintiff, 
one who did not need to be a member of the elite in order to have an 
effective advocate.381 
From the conservative point of view, private attorneys general 
ought to be looked upon more favorably than government law en-
forcers.  They are private actors; they are “privatizing law enforce-
ment pursuant to the ideals of economic efficiency.”382  Moreover, 
even those plaintiffs’ lawyers accurately labeled “mercenary” ought to 
be admired by conservatives, for they are actualizing their economic 
self-interest. 
Yet conservatives dislike the private attorney general.  They con-
tend that plaintiffs’ lawyers, unlike business persons, do not make 
anything; such lawyers are parasites, living off others’ rights and 
claims, exploiting the legal system for profit.  Conservatives ignore 
the fact, however, that many businesses do not “make” things.  The 
service industries, for example, comprise a large segment of the 
modern economy.383  Moreover, even in the companies that do “make 
things,” the extravagantly compensated corporate executives do not, 
as illustrated by a recent New Yorker cartoon.  The cartoon depicts a 
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father, relaxing in his easy chair, enjoying a glass of wine and a cigar.  
He looks proudly into the eyes of his earnest son and explains, “Yes, I 
do make things, son.  I make things called deals.”384 
Moreover, and most importantly, suits by private attorneys gen-
eral represent law acting as ex post regulation, which, if one applies 
conservative theory, is to be preferred to ex ante regulation.  Private 
lawsuits require neither a regulatory scheme nor a state bureaucracy 
to enforce it.  Lawsuits are comparatively private in nature.385  Yet con-
servatives vehemently lobby and rail against the “trial lawyers,”386 as if 
the plaintiffs’ bar is the root of the evil rather than just another self-
interested responder.  In fact, were it not for the conservative trend 
in interpreting commercial contracts involving an imbalance of 
power,387 combined with a failure of legislative reform to keep up with 
                                                          
 384 William Hamilton, NEW YORKER, June 3, 2002, at 56. 
 385 See Garth et al., supra note 379, at 353 (asserting that conservatives “find virtue 
in the private attorney general concept because of its function in ‘privatizing’ law en-
forcement pursuant to the ideals of economic efficiency”). 
 386 See Joshua Greene, John Edwards, Esq., WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2001, at 34.  In 
what has become an especially timely article about Sen. John Edwards, Greene re-
counts the following: 
Tax cuts aside, nothing is closer to George W. Bush’s heart than dis-
mantling the current legal system.  Long before there was “compas-
sionate conservatism,” Bush was attacking the excesses of trial lawyers.  
In Texas, demonizing lawyers is a hallowed tradition long predating 
Bush’s governorship.  In the mid-1980s, state Republicans and conser-
vative Democrats began targeting what they considered predatory liti-
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Rubin, supra note 381, at 20. 
 It follows that when conservative courts reject private plaintiffs who are at-
tempting to enforce statutorily created rights, they are returning the legal system, 
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changes in the marketplace, citizen suits could still serve as effective 
countervailing forces to corporate misconduct.388 
Some jurisdictions continue to authorize citizens to vindicate 
public and private rights effectively.  California stands at the forefront 
in its legislative efforts to restore the balance of power stolen from 
citizens in the name of “freedom.”  California’s tripartite statutory 
scheme389 remains among the most consumer-friendly in the nation, 
rejecting the regressive conservative trend on standing390 and permit-
ting citizens to participate actively in enforcement of laws designed to 
protect them.  Because of pro-citizen statutory treatment in such key 
areas as scienter, injury, and remedies, California courts do not have 
readily available the pro-corporate option of routinely granting sum-
mary judgment to corporate defendants, thereby denying consumers 
their day in court.  Other jurisdictions, including Texas, New Jersey, 
Georgia, and Alabama,391 have kept their consumer statutes strong de-
spite a nationwide trend in the opposite direction, though court en-
forcement has not always followed. 
Commentators voice valid concerns about the secondary conse-
quences of allowing individuals to act for themselves or on behalf of 
the public interest against the bastions of concentrated wealth.  Such 
negative effects include nuisance suits brought to force settlement; 
windfalls to plaintiffs’ attorneys who “free ride” on class actions, on 
the government’s or other firms’ coattails; and excessive damages 
awards by juries, especially punitive damages.392  None of these prob-
lems is insurmountable.  For example, in the area of malpractice ac-
tions against health care providers, conservatives have suggested far-
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reaching reforms, focusing in the area of placing ceilings on punitive 
damage awards.393  Such a solution is one way of keeping the interests 
in balance. 
In any event, others have written fully and persuasively on these 
matters.  My focus here has been on the discrepancies between what 
conservatives say they believe and the policies they support.  In the 
wake of widespread corporate malfeasance, it is time to reexamine 
the conservative assumption, held despite contradictory historical 
and contemporary evidence, that the laissez-faire system works with-
out meaningful regulation.  Conservatives’ invocation of a romanti-
cized “free market America” is disingenuous and counter to the de-
mocratic ideal of personal liberty. 
Conservative policies have removed accountability from the eco-
nomic and political equation.  Frequently citing personal account-
ability as a core value for the responsible citizen, conservatives fight 
measures that would ensure it in business and politics.394  Until very 
recently, they opposed enforcement of basic standards of honesty and 
fair dealing by corporations, appointing a figure with blatant divided 
loyalties as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.395 
Existing deterrents to corporate misconduct remain ineffective 
because most consequences can be passed on, covertly, to sharehold-
ers and consumers.  Fines, damage awards, and disgorgement of 
unlawfully gained profits are considered, and therefore become, the 
cost of doing business.396  Accountability must come from somewhere.  
If under the conservative paradigm, there is no such thing as the 
“corporate citizen” responsible to greater society, then we must look 
to the individual citizens who comprise the corporation.  If, as con-
servatives claim, corporations do not exist separately from the aggre-
gate of individuals whose transactions occur under the corporate 
umbrella, then responsibility must be enforced at that individual 
level, in a way that substantially deters the malfeasance. 
Effective responses can and must come from a variety of sources: 
rigorous self-governance; balanced antitrust enforcement; imposition 
of accountability from external regulatory sources, both ex ante and 
ex post; and a refusal to return to failed formalism in contract.  Per-
haps most importantly, policy makers must demonstrate a willingness 
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to mature beyond the romantic precepts of Old West mythology and 
recognize that principles that may have worked in a less complex so-
ciety do not work today because of the disconnect resulting from lay-
ers of bureaucracy characterizing the twenty-first century corporation. 
While recent reforms make a start, I am concerned that little has 
been done to put significant power where it belongs: in the hands of 
citizen constituencies.  Conservative policies have helped create and 
sustain a culture promoting worship of powerful institutions and 
their elite “princes” that will not disappear with the creation of addi-
tional bureaucracies populated by a different selection of elites.  By 
corralling their morality in the limited sphere of personal relation-
ships, conservative advocates of unregulated big business have helped 
dismantle the very communities in which they hope to practice it and 
have perpetrated a damaging confusion between the concepts of self-
interest and public interest.397 
Thus, the fault lies not so much in the law as in the contradic-
tions informing it.  It is difficult to believe that, as a philosophical 
matter, conservative thinkers approve of the tangible results of ruth-
less pursuit of self-interest.  I do not believe that most people in gen-
eral want to place the ruthless pursuit of self-interest above the public 
good, but the people are less vocal in their opposition than the poli-
ticians and single-minded public advocates of the conservative 
agenda. 
As Professor Benjamin R. Barber of the University of Maryland 
wrote recently: 
[B]usiness malfeasance is the consequence neither of systemic 
capitalist contradictions nor private sin, which are endemic to 
capitalism and, indeed, to humanity.  It arises from a failure of 
the instruments of democracy, which have been weakened by 
three decades of market fundamentalism, privatization ideology 
and resentment of government. 
  Capitalism is not too strong; democracy is too weak.  We 
have not grown too hubristic as producers and consumers; we 
have grown too timid as citizens, acquiescing to deregulation and 
privatization . . . and a growing tyranny of money over politics. 
. . . .  Such attitudes represent a penchant for a go-it-alone eco-
nomics that undermines the social contract and turns corporate 
sins into virtues of the bottom line.398 
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